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ABSTRACT 
 
Changing climatic conditions and shifting global economics have thrust the 
Arctic into the spotlight for many scientists, academics, and policymakers as well as 
those in offshore industries, particularly in shipping and oil and gas. This research 
provides an overview of current U.S. Federal and State of Alaska environmental 
permitting requirements for offshore oil and gas development in the Beaufort and 
Chukchi Seas, highlighting the wicked problem of Arctic development: activities 
undertaken in the region are highly complex, involving significant political, social, 
environmental, and technical challenges. The economic opportunities that these Seas 
afford, and the high risks posed by pursuing these opportunities, call for the development 
of effective management strategies to avoid environmental catastrophes and maintain 
safe conditions for the stakeholders involved.  
The general questions guiding this research are: 1) How do Federal and State 
management of Beaufort and Chukchi Sea offshore oil and gas resources differ and how 
do the environmental permitting processes reflect this difference?  2) Is marine spatial 
planning (MSP) a viable tool for integrating these regulatory processes into a 
comprehensive planning process that balances stakeholder engagement, economic 
interests, and protection of the marine environment, all elements of the wicked problem? 
The analysis shows that MSP is worthy of consideration at the local or State level as a 
tool to help address these wicked problems elements, potentially allowing for a smoother 
permitting process.  
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1. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The sparsely populated Arctic region has long been an object of intrigue and 
mystery due to its remoteness, harsh environment, and abundance of natural resources. 
The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) estimates indicate that the area above the Arctic 
Circle may hold 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30% of the world’s 
undiscovered gas, most of which is offshore (Gautier et al., 2009). Exploration and 
production of this oil and gas is expected to increase, though high operational costs, 
unpredictable ice and climate conditions, and technical, social, and regulatory challenges 
will likely inhibit the pace of development (Ermida, 2014; Harsem, Eide, & Heen, 2011). 
The U.S. Arctic State, Alaska, has been producing oil from its North Slope onshore fields, 
as well as in the Beaufort Sea just offshore of these North Slope areas, since the 1970s 
(Ermida, 2014). There has been growing interest in the oil and gas deposits further 
offshore from the Arctic Alaska coast in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas (see Fig. 1 for the 
location of these seas), with development in these offshore areas expected to increase in 
the coming decades (Ermida, 2014). This research reviews the offshore oil and gas 
environmental permitting processes of the U.S. Federal Government and the State of 
Alaska regulatory agencies, reviews recent assessments by Federal and State officials 
regarding these permitting processes and the ability of the processes to accommodate 
increased offshore oil and gas development in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, and 
explores the suitability of marine spatial planning (MSP) as a tool that could engage all 
stakeholders at a high level in the planning process. 
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Figure 1. Beaufort Sea and Chukchi Sea Federal planning areas in yellow. (Source: BOEM) 
 
The regulatory process, combined with the unique political, social, economic, 
environmental, and technical challenges that oil and gas development in the region pose, 
fit the definition of a “wicked” problem (defined below in “Characteristics of the wicked 
problem”) and MSP may be one potential tool to address the need for balanced 
stakeholder engagement and marine environmental protection while seeking the economic 
benefits of offshore development. 
The general questions guiding this research are:  
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• How do Federal and State management of Beaufort and Chukchi Sea 
offshore oil and gas resources differ and how do the environmental 
permitting processes reflect this difference?   
• Is MSP a viable tool for integrating these regulatory processes into a 
comprehensive planning process that balances stakeholder engagement, 
economic interests, and protection of the marine environment, all elements 
of the wicked problem? 
Addressing these questions results in a greater understanding of the differing approaches 
taken by the Federal and State regulatory agencies and provides an indication as to where 
efforts could be combined more effectively toward a comprehensive ecosystem-based 
management strategy. 
 
Characteristics of the wicked problem 
 
The challenges and risks of oil and gas development in the Beaufort and Chukchi 
Seas, and the complex interactions among stakeholders in the region with differing views 
and values, demonstrate that exploration and production in these offshore areas fit the 
characteristics of a wicked problem and require new education, processes, and tools to 
navigate the planning process (Kämpf & Haley, 2011). “Wicked” problems, as described 
by Rittel and Webber  (1973), are those classes of social planning problems that are 
difficult to define and cannot be tackled through traditional linear, analytical approaches 
due to their incredibly complex natures. These wicked problems involve a problem that is 
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unstructured, complex, irregular, interactive, adaptive, and novel (Kämpf & Haley, 2011), 
set in contrast to “tame” problems, which may be very technically complex but can be 
tightly defined (Rittel & Webber, 1973). Traditional, linear risk management approaches 
for tame problems begin by understanding the problem at hand, analyzing the 
requirements of the stakeholders, formulating a solution, and, ultimately, implementing 
that solution (Conklin, 2001).  Wicked problems, however, require approaches that are 
more innovative and flexible than this linear model, using multiple tools or techniques 
that engage stakeholders by facilitating and structuring the debate of the wicked problem 
at hand (Pollack, 2007). In a wicked problem, the understanding of the problem is 
constantly evolving as new information or an unforeseen situation arises, meaning that a 
formerly-identified solution may no longer be the best course of action and alternative 
solutions must be weighed (Conklin, 2001). Offshore oil and gas development in the icy 
Beaufort and Chukchi Seas involves a high degree of technical challenges, posing risks 
from an engineering, oil spill response, and search-and-rescue standpoints; and the social-
ecological impacts on the unique Arctic ecosystem are largely unknown (Kämpf & Haley, 
2011). Stakeholder support and opposition for offshore development in these seas varies 
from group to group, and has even varied within single groups over time (Kämpf & 
Haley, 2011). For example, Edward Itta, a prominent Alaska Native leader and former 
Mayor of the North Slope Borough (NSB), Alaska’s northernmost regional government 
adjacent to the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, initially shared the opinion of other tribal and 
environmental groups that Arctic offshore development should be opposed due to risks to 
the environment and the subsistence hunting and fishing culture of the Alaska Natives 
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living in the region (Mouawad, 2007).  However, Itta and the NSB later shifted to 
supporting this offshore development with best practice environmental protection by 
acknowledging that modern Alaska Native identity was reliant on economic development 
through resource extraction (Glenn, Itta, & Napageak, 2011).  
The cultural and social framework of the Arctic Alaska Natives is deeply rooted in 
this subsistence lifestyle, which exists alongside oil and gas development. The link among 
the people, land, sea, and animals is demonstrated in Arctic Alaska Native customs and 
this direct interaction between the people and their environment has allowed the local 
residents to adapt and survive to changing environmental and resource conditions over 
thousands of years; however, oil and gas development in Arctic Alaska has evoked major 
changes to the way subsistence activities are carried out ("North Slope Borough 
Background Report," 2005). While oil and gas development allows for much-needed 
economic development in the region, the sparsely populated villages and communities in 
the Alaskan Arctic are spread out over long distances, as subsistence activities are likely 
to be more efficient in less dense settled areas, often making it difficult for these residents 
to take advantage of employment opportunities in large-scale resource operations 
(Huskey, 2009). “Family relationships and kinship” are another aspect integral to Arctic 
Alaska Native culture, shaping social interactions such as cooperative activities and 
sharing, and respect for this cultural aspect are important when considering the impacts of 
training and local hire initiatives resulting from increased resource development ("North 
Slope Borough Background Report," 2005). Additionally, oil and gas operations usually 
require a great deal of activity at the initial stages (i.e., construction), but many of the 
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positions created during this time of heavy activity may not last long (“Arctic Oil and Gas 
2007,” 2008). 
The steady increase of modern Western culture in Arctic Alaska resulting from an 
influx of non-Native workers and the adoption of modern technology over the last 150 
years for heating homes, transportation, communication, etc., has greatly influenced the 
Alaska Native cultural and social framework and increased oil and gas development in the 
region will most likely result in a stronger influence ("North Slope Borough Background 
Report," 2005). The balance between adapting to this increasing development and 
maintaining certain cultural traditions, such as subsistence hunting and fishing and 
traditional values, should be considered when discussing the potential social and cultural 
impacts of offshore oil and gas development in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas. 
There is a need for an adaptive management approach and “problem-structuring 
tools” to aid in conceptualizing risk by stakeholders in the region, if economic 
development from offshore oil and gas extraction is to occur with a high level of 
environmental protection (Kämpf & Haley, 2011). A potential tool for achieving the type 
of structured stakeholder discussion described by Pollack (2007) for wicked problems is 
MSP, a process which has been defined as “[a]nalyzing and allocating parts of three-
dimensional marine spaces to specific uses or non-use, to achieve ecological, economic, 
and social objectives that are usually specified through a political process” (Douvere & 
Ehler, 2009). One of the hallmark traits of MSP is that it requires stakeholder 
collaboration in its design, implementation, and evaluation of plans for offshore 
development, aiming to achieve social, economic, and ecological objectives for projects 
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that may positively or negatively affect key stakeholders (Ehler & Douvere, 2010). MSP 
may offer a practical solution for this issue of stakeholder engagement in Beaufort and 
Chukchi oil and gas exploration and production, providing a systematic approach that 
takes into account the temporal and spatial aspects of wicked offshore oil and gas 
planning issues by attempting to map out the various ocean uses by each relevant 
stakeholder and facilitating collaboration among stakeholders with conflicting views and 
values with the goal of reaching consensus before projects move forward. 
 
The Arctic Council 
 
The Arctic countries of Canada, Denmark (through its autonomous province of 
Greenland), Norway, Russia, and the United States all have valuable oil and gas deposits 
in the Arctic offshore and varying strategies to develop these resources. Russia has been 
developing its oil and gas resources in the Arctic since the 1970’s, starting in the West 
Siberia region ("Arctic Resource Development: Risks and Responsible Management," 
2012). Norway has begun to step up activity in the Barents Sea, where oil and gas 
exploration has been carried out for thirty years ("Arctic Resource Development: Risks 
and Responsible Management," 2012). Recently, exploratory drilling for petroleum off 
the coast of Greenland, in Baffin Bay to the west and in the waters to the northeast, has 
begun ("Arctic Resource Development: Risks and Responsible Management," 2012). In 
the Arctic waters off the coasts of Canada and the U.S., petroleum exploration in the 
Beaufort Sea has taken place since 1976 and, in the past decade, interest in Alaska’s 
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portion of the Chukchi Sea has grown, with Shell, Statoil, and ConocoPhillips holding 
leases in the area ("Arctic Resource Development: Risks and Responsible Management," 
2012). While the five Arctic nation-states mentioned above control territorial claims in the 
Arctic offshore, the other Arctic nations involved in cooperation on issues related to the 
region include Iceland, Finland, and Sweden, which do not have territorial claims in the 
Arctic offshore (Johnston, 2010) but still have land in the region above the Arctic Circle. 
These eight Arctic nation-states form the membership of the Arctic Council, an 
intergovernmental forum established by the Ottawa Declaration in 1996 that serves as the 
main decision-making mechanism for development in the region (Johnston, 2010; “Arctic 
Resource Development: Risks and Responsible Management,” 2012). The Arctic Council 
is the only established international forum where all of the Arctic coastal states agree to 
discuss Arctic affairs ("Arctic Resource Development: Risks and Responsible 
Management," 2012) and of which several other countries and international organizations 
have been granted observer status (Johnston, 2010). Additionally, some indigenous 
peoples’ organizations have been granted the status of permanent participants, which have 
a role similar to that of member states (Young, 2009). The stated purpose of the Arctic 
Council is “to provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction 
among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic Indigenous communities and 
other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular, issues of sustainable 
development and environmental protection in the Arctic” ("About Us - History," 2014).  
Most of the territorial claims containing oil and gas resources in the Arctic are 
settled; however, there are four bilateral disputes outstanding and one with international 
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ramifications regarding the outer delimitation of Arctic continental shelves ("Arctic 
Resource Development: Risks and Responsible Management," 2012). As the focus of this 
research is on the U.S. portion of the Arctic, it should be noted that two of these bilateral 
disputes involve the U.S. Arctic boundaries: one with Russia in the Bering Strait and one 
with Canada in the Beaufort Sea ("Arctic Resource Development: Risks and Responsible 
Management," 2012). The latter dispute will be discussed in section 3.  Though the 
disputes involve relatively small areas and the risk for armed conflict over these areas is 
low, it is important to note that these ongoing territorial disputes in the Arctic Ocean are 
not purely the result of economic interests by the Arctic nation-states, but also involve 
aspects of national security (“Arctic Resource Development,” 2012; Kříž & Chrášťanský, 
2012). Increasing ship traffic through the region, specifically, means that the international 
maritime borders of the Arctic nations will likely see an increase in transits by foreign 
vessels, requiring greater monitoring from national defense agencies.  
The Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) produced by the Arctic Council 
contains a section on the human dimensions of Arctic development, describing “human 
dimensions” as the “interrelationships of people and the environment, particularly with 
respect to environmental change” (AMSA, 2009). The section mentions local shipping 
that will support oil and gas installations stating that if this development increases, the 
economic consequences in the affected regions will be far-reaching, as will the 
environmental impacts (AMSA, 2009). With this in mind, AMSA points out that “the 
difference between negative impacts and positive or neutral ones is often a question of 
planning and preparation” (AMSA, 2009). 
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The Arctic Council has established working groups to address numerous issues 
related to environmental protection, the health of Arctic peoples, and safety in the region.  
Chairmanship of the Arctic Council rotates every two years between the eight member 
states, with Canada as chair in 2013-2015 and the U.S. assuming chairmanship for 2015-
2017, after holding the position previously from 1998-2000 ("About Us - History," 2014). 
One of the working groups, Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), has 
produced “Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines” that outline the following classic 
international environmental principles upon which offshore oil and gas development in 
the Arctic should be based: 1) principle of the precautionary approach, which, ultimately, 
“ensures that a substance or activity posing a threat to the environment is prevented from 
adversely affecting the environment” (Cameron & Abouchar, 1991); 2) polluter pays 
principle; 3) continuous improvement; and 4) sustainable development. Adherence to 
these principles could reflect poorly or favorably on the U.S. especially when the country 
assumes chairmanship of the Arctic Council, so oil and gas planning at the Federal and 
State level should reflect these principles.  
 
Increased and new users of the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas 
 
Predictions for the extent of sea ice loss in the Arctic vary greatly and the 
environmental effects of climate change in the Arctic are largely unknown and currently 
being studied extensively. Despite these uncertainties, several facts have become apparent 
over the last several years: the volume of ship traffic through the region has increased and 
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is expected to continue to increase (Smith & Stephenson, 2013), and oil and gas deposits 
under the seabed remain important assets for the Arctic nations.  Based on the USGS 
assessments of these undiscovered resources, the U.S. portion of the Arctic contains the 
second largest oil and gas deposits in the Arctic region, behind Russia (Gautier et al., 
2009). By one model, petroleum production accounted for nearly 29% of Alaska resident 
personal income in 2005, showing the great importance of oil and gas in the State’s 
economy (Goldsmith, 2009) since 1977, when oil first flowed in the 800-mile long Trans-
Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) from Prudhoe Bay on Alaska’s North Slope to the 
deepwater port in Valdez for transport to refineries (Grant, 2010). In order to support the 
expected increased shipping and offshore oil and gas development in this region, there 
must be sufficient infrastructure to support these industries and, thus, it is reasonable to 
assume that the Alaskan Arctic coastal zones along the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas will be 
the sites of increasing development in the coming decades.  
Stephenson, Smith, & Agnew (2011) created a model to quantify offshore and 
ground transportation development in the Arctic using climate and sea-ice scenarios, 
finding that maritime access in the Arctic is likely to increase while inland road networks, 
which currently rely heavily on ice roads during the winter season, will face greater 
challenges if predicted milder air temperatures and/or deeper snowfall trends continue. In 
addition to these onshore support infrastructure challenges, storms, floating icebergs, and 
limited manpower are among the great challenges facing development in the Arctic 
offshore, and the region may not be currently capable of handling a large oil spill due to 
these complexities (Harsem, Eide, & Heen, 2011).  The host of complex technical 
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difficulties for continued oil and gas exploration and development in the Beaufort and 
Chukchi Seas, coupled with the social complexities arising from diverse groups of 
stakeholders in the Alaskan Arctic, indicate the need for a planning process that considers 
and weighs as many elements of this wicked problem as possible.  
Most currently producing offshore drilling sites in the U.S. Arctic are located 
onshore or in State waters (within three miles from the coastline) but new sites will 
continue to move outward from the coastline into Federal waters as technology advances 
and these sites become more economical to develop (Houseknecht & Bird, 2006), while 
still potentially requiring use of State waters for transport to onshore infrastructure such as 
pipelines. Disasters occurring in marine environments, such as oil spills from a well 
blowout similar to the Deepwater Horizon incident in 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico, can be 
difficult to contain and can cross into Federal or State waters due to currents, winds, and 
other outside factors; the cold waters, sea ice, and unique sea life in the Arctic further 
complicate this issue and require additional consideration in risk assessments. For these 
reasons, among others, it is important to consider how the different jurisdictional entities 
plan their permitting of offshore oil and gas leases, as environmental incidents that may 
occur in one jurisdictional boundary are not confined to those boundaries and can have 
significant adverse impacts to the larger ecosystem. Such a spill would be subject to the 
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and other Federal statutes, discussed in Section 3, regardless of 
whether it was in Federal or State waters ("Federal Offshore Lands," 2014). 
A report from the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), a 
working group of the Arctic Council, found that, currently, 80-90% of petroleum 
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hydrocarbons entering the Arctic environment were estimated as originating from natural 
seeps, though overall concentrations in the marine and coastal environments were low 
("Arctic Oil and Gas 2007," 2008). The largest human source of hydrocarbons in the 
Arctic was found to be from oil spills, though, to date, there have not been any large oil 
spills in the Arctic from oil and gas extraction activities ("Arctic Oil and Gas 2007," 
2008). Such oil spills are considered to be the greatest environmental threat in the region, 
though frequent smaller spills could have substantial impacts as well ("Arctic Oil and Gas 
2007," 2008). The cold water temperatures combined with sea ice, unique marine life, 
wide array of migratory seabirds, currents, and severe weather patterns that could inhibit 
response capabilities are among the concerns that such a large oil spill in the Arctic would 
be devastating ("Arctic Oil and Gas 2007," 2008).  Other cumulative environmental 
effects of oil and gas development in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas include physical 
disturbance, such as construction of gravel islands and causeways that can impede fish 
migrations and nearshore water flow, disturbance of benthic habitats from dredging and 
drilling, and disturbance of ice habitats from icebreakers used in support of oil and gas 
operations ("Arctic Oil and Gas 2007," 2008). An additional cumulative effect is the 
increase of human-generated noise in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas which can cause 
short-term behavioral changes in fish and marine mammals near the noise source; to date, 
no long-lasting effects on fish stocks or marine ecosystems have been found ("Arctic Oil 
and Gas 2007," 2008), though attention is increasingly being given to the issue (see 
Appendix A for a timeline of recent final rules from Federal agencies and major court 
cases related to marine acoustics). Besides cumulative effects on the natural environment, 
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increased oil and gas activities can also lead to adverse social and cultural impacts, such 
as the arrival of large numbers of new workers to remote communities, potentially 
creating tensions with local residents and straining local resources, or activities that 
disrupt traditional subsistence hunting and fishing and that could lead to conflicts among 
users of the marine space ("Arctic Oil and Gas 2007," 2008). 
In order to achieve truly comprehensive ecosystem-based management in the 
Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, all stakeholders need to be engaged from the beginning of the 
planning process so that multiple activities with multiple users can be accounted for when 
determining where to allow oil and gas installations to occur and under what conditions. 
Collaboration among stakeholders allows for the identification of perceived risks 
stemming from the wicked problem of offshore oil and gas development in this region, 
allowing for key stakeholders to continually update wicked risk assessments. Though a 
wicked risk assessment is outside of the scope of this research, it is important to 
remember that when dealing with a wicked problem, it is impossible to fully understand 
and manage all risks (Kämpf & Haley, 2011) so these risks must be dealt with in a context 
of great uncertainty regarding their potential effects. Uncertainties inherent in a wicked 
problem such as this one can stem from a lack of scientific knowledge, as well as from 
strategic and institutional factors, e.g., stakeholders with differing perceptions of risks and 
fragmented decision-making arenas at international, Federal, State, and local levels (van 
Bueren, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 2003). Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can play a 
crucial role in achieving the integration of ecosystem-based management by helping to 
find solutions and offering concrete proposals (Calado et al., 2012). NGOs play an 
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independent role in society, unlike government entities, and “can act as facilitators 
between governments and communities and, if necessary, across government departments 
and agencies” (Calado et al., 2012). Given this unique position of NGOs, strategies 
developed with the goal of ecosystem-based management in the Beaufort and Chukchi 
Seas should allow for their involvement at a high level. 
 
Federal and State offshore oil and gas permitting 
 
The U.S. Arctic State, Alaska, serves as a valuable oil-producing region and the 
history of oil and gas development there illustrates the complex nature of the Federal-
State relationship present in the state, resulting in a complex permitting process for 
projects. The majority of oil and gas activities in the Alaskan Arctic have been 
concentrated in the State onshore and offshore areas along and in the Beaufort Sea as well 
as the Federal offshore areas immediately adjacent to the Federal-State maritime 
boundary in the Beaufort; however, USGS resource estimates indicate that the total mean 
volume of undiscovered oil and gas resources in Arctic Alaska are distributed 
approximately evenly between Federal and State offshore areas in the Beaufort and 
Chukchi Seas (Houseknecht & Bird, 2006). With this potential for increased oil and gas 
activity in areas under Federal jurisdiction in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas realized, 
Executive Order 13580 in 2011 established the Interagency Working Group on 
Coordination of Domestic Energy Development and Permitting in Alaska, led by the 
Department of the Interior, to coordinate Federal agencies involved in the permitting of 
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onshore and offshore oil and gas projects. Among the duties listed for the working group 
in the Executive Order is the obligation to “coordinate Federal engagement with States, 
localities, and tribal governments, as it relates to energy development and permitting 
issues in Alaska” ("Executive Order 13580," 2011). A 2013 Federal report by the 
Interagency Working Group listed current shortcomings of the management of Federal 
permitting of these offshore projects, stating that “[t]hese challenges underscore the 
complexity and possible variability of evaluating potential projects and plans in the Arctic 
with a proposal-by-proposal, area-by-area, piecemeal approach. In the rapidly changing 
Arctic, the current decision-making framework for managing natural resources may not be 
sufficiently flexible to adapt to future demands and emerging conflicts” (Clement, 
Bengston, & Kelly, 2013). This statement further demonstrates how oil and gas 
development in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas fits the definition of a wicked problem. 
This admission of shortcomings in the Federal report demonstrates the need for a better 
decision-making framework, one that incorporates elements of wicked risk assessment 
among the many key players in Arctic offshore oil and gas planning and suggests that 
agencies may make decisions with negative consequences that could have been avoided if 
there was a higher level of coordination among stakeholders. In addition to this awareness 
of the issue at the Federal level, the Governor of Alaska and representatives from various 
State agencies have indicated that they intend the State to have a high level of 
involvement in the overall Federal planning of offshore oil and gas development in the 
Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, so that local stakeholders can provide input during the 
17 
 
planning process (“Governor Comments on National Arctic Strategy,” 2013; Carducci, 
2012; Jensen, 2010). 
The number of regulatory agencies involved in Beaufort and Chukchi Sea oil and 
gas projects depends on a particular project’s scope and locale within jurisdictional 
boundaries. Stakeholders can use the judicial system to point out ambiguities, gaps, or 
unintended consequences of regulations at any step in a project’s process by filing 
lawsuits against regulators or project owners; and each regulator can withhold permits, 
financially penalize, and criminally charge negligent project owners (Khadjinova, 2014). 
Additionally, public participation can influence the regulatory process in non-litigious 
ways through lobbying of elected officials and though the submission of public comment 
at various stages in a project; additionally, Federally-recognized tribal governments must 
be formally consulted by Federal agencies taking action on projects (Khadjinova, 2014). 
The diverse views and values of stakeholders in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, and the 
effect that these opinions may have on the permitting process, contribute to a regulatory 
system that is constantly changing. In the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, a single project 
could fall under the jurisdiction of local, State, and/or Federal levels of government 
regulation, further complicating this ever-changing regulatory process (Khadjinova, 
2014). In this research, the focus is on the Federal and State levels of regulation as they 
comprise the majority of regulatory layers for oil and gas projects in the Beaufort and 
Chukchi Seas. While looking at the Federal and State relationship as it relates to oil and 
gas development in Alaska, it is important to keep in mind that it is the permits from 
Federal and State regulatory agencies that are directly binding on those oil and gas 
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companies choosing to operate in the U.S. portion of the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas and 
that these permits determine at least a part of the conditions under which these companies 
may operate. Besides regulations, oil and gas industry standards and individual corporate 
environmental strategies are an important component of environmental protection, 
(Sharma, 2000), though industry standards and corporate strategies are outside of the 
scope of this research.  
It has been noted that despite having a history of open decision making, the U.S. 
has often made ad hoc or politically motivated decisions regarding Arctic resource 
development that lacked a broadly understandable, reviewable rationale (Flanders, Brown, 
Andre'eva, & Larichev, 1998). While this ad hoc issuance of offshore oil and gas permits 
in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas may consider the particular requirements for marine 
protection in the area immediately surrounding an offshore project in question, the 
cumulative effects of multiple permitted projects and activities in the Alaskan Arctic 
marine environment can lead to unforeseen conflicts between users or some degree of 
preventable degradation of the marine environment. By law, regulatory agencies must act 
on their permitting authority separately (Khadjinova, 2014), making coordination among 
agencies difficult. In order to address this piecemeal approach to permitting, the State of 
Alaska established the Office of Project Management and Permitting to handle large 
projects under its jurisdiction and provide a single point of contact for these large projects; 
however, there is not a direct equivalent to this mechanism at the Federal level 
(Khadjinova, 2014) and the need to better coordinate between the State and Federal level 
exists as projects in the Beaufort and Chukchi may fall under the jurisdiction of both 
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entities.  With this in mind, a new framework to evaluate the issuance of permits within 
the larger combined U.S. and Alaska Arctic marine environment, consisting of the 
Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, with multiple users may be necessary for the future in order 
to address the potential cumulative effects of activities at an early stage. 
The U.S. adopted a National Strategy for the Arctic Region in 2013 (herein 
NSAR) and stated that the “United States will continue to emphasize the Arctic Council 
as a forum for facilitating Arctic states’ cooperation on myriad issues of mutual interest 
within its current mandate” (National Strategy for the Arctic Region, 2013). The NSAR 
also mentions that the proven and potential oil and gas reserves in the U.S. Arctic “will 
likely continue to provide valuable supplies to meet U.S. energy needs” and must be 
developed in a responsible manner with an aim of maintaining healthy ecosystems. In 
January 2014, the White House released an Implementation Plan for the NSAR, outlining 
objectives and next steps for lead agencies (Implementation Plan for the National Strategy 
for the Arctic Region, 2014). While the guidelines set by the Arctic Council and the 
NSAR can aid in the overall planning of offshore oil and gas in the Beaufort and Chukchi 
Seas at the higher government planning levels, it is the permits from regulatory agencies 
that directly bind companies to specific legal requirements at the project levels.  
In addition to the Federal government, the State of Alaska plays an important role 
in Arctic oil and gas developments within its waters. The State of Alaska Department of 
Natural Resources (ADNR), Division of Oil & Gas, has a goal to “foster an environment 
of open communication with all stakeholders,” as well as to map work processes and 
relate those processes back to statutes and regulations to ensure consistency ("Annual 
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Report," 2012). Arctic development issues can make communication difficult since the 
topics and their importance in decision making may be outside of the expertise of many 
people, including those involved in high levels of government decision making at the 
Federal level (Flanders et al., 1998). This is particularly relevant in the U.S., where 
Alaska is the only Arctic state with an entirely different climate and set of concerns than 
the remaining 49 states, especially those in the Gulf of Mexico region where the majority 
of U.S. offshore oil and gas development occurs (see Fig. 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Crude Oil Production – Alaska and Offshore.  Gulf of Mexico Federal offshore oil production 
accounts for 23 percent of total U.S. crude oil production, and the majority of U.S. crude oil offshore 
production.  In this graph, Alaska production includes both onshore and offshore. (Source: EIA, BOEM) 
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Land ownership 
 
In order to understand the Federal and State relationship as it pertains to oil and 
gas development in the Alaskan Arctic, it is necessary to look briefly at land ownership 
status in the state. The 1867 purchase of the Alaska territory from Russia made the United 
States an Arctic nation (Grant, 2010). In 1912, the territory of Alaska was allowed an 
elected legislature with limited authority (Ascott, 2003) and the 1959 granting of 
statehood to the 49th State in the Union (Grant, 2010) further solidified this status as an 
Arctic nation for the U.S. and allowed Alaska residents to have greater control over their 
affairs, rather than to be governed from afar by Washington, D.C. ("Modern Alaska - 
Statehood," 2014). In 1920, Congress designated a large oil reserve on Alaska’s Arctic 
coast, National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska (NPR-A), and in 1960, the Secretary of the 
Interior designated 8.9 million acres in northeast Alaska to create the Arctic National 
Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), set aside for conservation purposes (Grant, 2010). Selection of 
State lands also began in 1960, with the area on the North Slope between the NPR-A and 
ANWR as the first to be selected by the State from the Federal government due to the 
known oil deposits in the region (Grant, 2010). This State land selection process was 
complicated in 1965 when a provision in the Alaska Statehood Act was brought to light: 
the Act denied the right to claim lands potentially subject to aboriginal title (Grant, 2010). 
The Alaska Federation of Natives (AFN), composed of members of Eskimo, Indian, and 
Aleut descent, was formed to address this issue of aboriginal title to lands and the Alaska 
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Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) was signed by President Nixon in 1971 (Grant, 
2010). Figure 3 is a map of general land ownership status in Alaska. 
 
Figure 3. General land ownership status in Alaska. The state-owned land shown in the northeast portion of 
the state is situated between NPR-A to the west and ANWR to the east. (Source: Alaska Humanities Forum, 
ADNR) 
  
ANCSA stated that Alaska Natives (the term Alaska Natives is used to indicate the 
indigenous peoples of Alaska) would forfeit aboriginal title to their lands in exchange for 
roughly 44 million acres of land divided among 220 villages and 12 regional Native-run 
corporations (see Fig. 4). These corporations would hold full title and subsurface rights 
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and administer cash payments from the Federal and State governments (Grant, 2010). 
These cash payments came in the sum of $962.5 million from the Federal government as 
compensation to Alaska Natives for extinguishment of aboriginal title to lands and to 
assist with the establishment of Alaska Native corporations that would hold fee simple 
absolute title or traditional western title to smaller areas of land (Ongtooguk, 1986). These 
Alaska Native corporations would in turn administer payments to their Alaska Native 
shareholders from investment revenues (Ongtooguk, 1986).  
 
 
Figure 4. Map showing the 12 Alaska Native regional corporations. Arctic Slope Regional Corporation 
(ASRC) is the primary corporation associated with the Alaska Natives occupying the lands adjacent to the 
Beaufort and Chukchi Seas. (Source: ADNR) 
 
 
In 1980, the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) effectively 
completed the “carving up” of Alaska lands into a complex patchwork of Federal, State, 
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and Native lands by determining what lands would be set aside for national parks, refuges, 
and other conservation areas; what lands were to be held by Alaska Native corporations; 
and what lands were available for the State to select (Gallagher, 1988). ANILCA came 
about as an attempt by the Federal government to reconcile controversy between 
development and environmental interests in land use in Alaska, primarily as it pertained to 
access of public lands for specific purposes such as plane, boat, or snowmachine use 
("Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act," 2011). ANILCA resulted in 
approximately 104 million acres being designated to conservation systems in Alaska (see 
Fig. 5), though ANILCA specifically left the issue of whether or not to allow oil 
development in ANWR, where the coastal plain is estimated to hold billions of barrels of 
oil, to a future vote by Congress (Hull & Leask, 2000). 
Since roughly 90% of Alaska lands are managed by Federal or State agencies (as 
of 2000, approximately 65% by Federal, 24% by State, and the remaining 11% managed 
by Alaska Native corporations or as private land—see Fig. 6), a high level of planning 
and coordination between Federal and State regulatory agencies is required in determining 
how areas should be managed (Todd, 2001). 
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Figure 5. Lands set aside as Federal conservation areas by ANILCA. The white block in the northeast 
corner of the state indicates the location of ANWR. (Source: Wikimedia Commons) 
 
 
Each of these agencies must weigh the value of Alaska’s land, waters, and wildlife 
in addition to the competing economic interests of key stakeholders involved in 
developing the State’s natural resources (Todd, 2001), such as oil and gas companies. In 
an ecologically sensitive area such as the Arctic, this coordination is paramount to success 
in safeguarding against environmental degradation while seeking to achieve maximum 
economic benefit. 
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Figure 6. Alaska land management status. (Source: The Nature Conservancy) 
 
 
In terms of the submerged lands offshore in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, 
jurisdiction is split between State and Federal. Under the Submerged Lands Act of 1952 
(43 U.S.C. §1301 et seq.), the State of Alaska owns all lands permanently or periodically 
covered by tidal waters up to, but not above, the line of mean high tide and seaward to a 
line three nautical miles from the coast (Tide & Submerged Land Ownership, 2000). After 
the three mile limit and until 200 nautical miles from the shore, the Federal government 
owns the submerged lands, subsoil, and seabed that comprise the Exclusive Economic 
Zone of the U.S., or EEZ, formally established by Presidential Proclamation 5030 in 1983 
("Outer Continental Shelf," 2014). Prior to this Proclamation, the Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act of 1976 (16 U.S.C. §1801-1882, 94 Pub. L. No. 265, 90 Stat. 331) 
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declared a Fishery Conservation Zone that extended from the State seaward boundary to 
200 miles offshore. In 1977, the Act was retitled the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act (96 Pub. L. No. 561, 94 Stat. 3275) and in 1996, the Act was given its 
current name, the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act 
(MFCMA) (104 Pub. L. No. 297, 110 Stat. 3009). This offshore area under Federal 
jurisdiction is referred to as the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) for oil and gas planning. 
 
Sea usage 
 
Maritime usage of the Alaskan Arctic in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas has a rich 
history and is still vastly important for the subsistence lifestyles of Alaska Natives living 
in the Arctic.  The Beaufort and Chukchi Seas have been the site of continuous indigenous 
marine use, expeditions and explorations, and have experienced expanding use by the 
global shipping industry (Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment, 2009). The first explorers 
in the region were the indigenous peoples, who have used Arctic waters for thousands of 
years (Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment, 2009). Early Western exploration of the Arctic 
was primarily driven by the search for the Northwest Passage (NWP) which passes 
through the U.S. portions of the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas (see Fig. 7), though it was not 
until 1906 that the Norwegian explorer Roald Amundsen became the first vessel to 
complete the NWP (Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment, 2009). Whaling led to a great 
increase in the number of Arctic expeditions and was the most massive, sustained Arctic 
marine shipping activity, with over 39,000 whaling voyages between 1610 and 1915, 
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mainly led by the Netherlands, Germany, Britain, and the United States (Arctic Marine 
Shipping Assessment, 2009). These early voyages resulted in the loss of many sailors and 
ships due to hazardous sea ice and extreme weather conditions; however, those sailors that 
survived the journey gained specialized knowledge of sea ice distribution and ship 
handling in ice, encouraging further expeditions (Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment, 
2009).  
 
 
Figure 7. Arctic shipping routes. (Source: The Arctic Institute) 
 
 
In recent years, the reduction of summer sea ice coupled with better Arctic ship 
engineering, offshore natural resource development in the region, and a changing global 
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economy—especially due to the growth of markets in Asia—have resulted in an increase 
of Arctic passages by ships, particularly along Russia’s Northern Sea Route (NSR) (see 
Fig. 7), which passes through Alaska’s Bering Strait (Brigham, 2011). 
 
Alaska Native use of the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas 
 
The Alaska Natives who have called and continue to call the Alaskan Arctic home 
have adapted to life in the harsh conditions present there and remain reliant on subsistence 
lifestyles, especially the abundant sea life in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, the two seas 
located on the U.S. Arctic Alaska OCS. The 2012 U.S. Census determined the population 
of the North Slope Borough, Alaska’s northernmost region that borders the Beaufort and 
Chukchi Seas, to be 9,643, with 52.9% of that population identifying as American Indian 
or Alaska Native (U.S. Census, 2012). ANILCA gave priority to hunting and fishing on 
Federal lands by rural residents of Alaska and in 1999, the Federal government took over 
regulation of subsistence fishing on navigable waters on or near Federal conservation 
units after a 1995 Federal court ruling, Katie John v. United States (Hull & Leask, 2000). 
Katie John v. United States was a case in which Alaska Natives contested the rules 
designating certain Federal waters that were classified as “public lands” for rural 
subsistence hunting and fishing priority under ANILCA as too narrow (John v. United 
States, 2013). The ruling invalidated Dept. of Interior regulations that had exempted 
waters under Federal jurisdiction from the definition of “Federal public lands” and 
resulted in Federal officials providing rural residents of Alaska with a preferential right to 
30 
 
take fish and game in these waters (John v. United States, 2013). With offshore oil and 
gas development, consideration of subsistence fishing and whaling plays an important part 
in Federal and State planning of projects, as accommodations must be made that allow 
subsistence activities to continue. Poor planning that could lead to a halt in subsistence 
activities due to releases of contaminants into the marine environment, disturbance of fish 
and marine mammal habitats, or other disturbances, could lead to a loss of food security 
for the subsistence users and result in litigation against the transgressor.  While it is 
impossible to bring the risk of environmental accidents from oil and gas activities to zero, 
careful planning combined with Arctic-specific engineering standards and operating 
procedures can greatly reduce this risk. Additionally, local and Alaska Native knowledge, 
particularly of sea ice conditions and other hazards important to offshore oil and gas 
activities in the Beaufort and Chukchi often play an important—though informal—role in 
planning and emergency-response activities (Eicken, Ritchie, & Barlau, 2010). However, 
there is currently not a sufficient organizational structure to formally incorporate a 
productive exchange of local and Alaska Native knowledge on the North Slope of Alaska 
(Eicken et al., 2010). It has been proposed that the creation of such an organizational 
structure to formally engage the local and Alaska Native stakeholders in mitigation and 
hazard planning could be more effective than merely soliciting public comment on 
projects (Eicken et al., 2010) 
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Marine Spatial Planning as a potential solution 
 
MSP is a tool for managing an increasingly growing maritime economy while 
simultaneously providing a means to protect marine biodiversity, and has the potential to 
guide single sector management of marine activities toward integrated sea use 
management (Douvere, 2008). MSP incorporates the concept of ecosystem-based 
management with more specific marine-based criteria and mapping for use by resource 
managers and for discussion by all stakeholders, taking into account the fact that specific 
activities only occur in certain areas of the ocean (Douvere, 2008). For example, 
important ecological areas are found where there is a high diversity of species and 
productivity, while economic activities can only occur where their resources of interest 
are located; this is also the case on land, but MSP has to be adapted from land use 
planning to account for the “dynamic and three-dimensional nature of marine 
environments” (Douvere, 2008). Thus, MSP requires input from stakeholders to 
determine how all possible activities in a marine environment are ranked in terms of 
social importance. 
Due to its wicked nature, the planning of Beaufort and Chukchi oil and gas 
development requires an innovative approach to address the unique complexities that 
stakeholders, including project planners, face in the these seas (Kämpf & Haley, 2011). 
For this reason, Federal and State planners should work together closely to draw upon all 
available Arctic expertise from a social, cultural, economic, and environmental 
perspective and utilize the most relevant information when making decisions regarding 
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offshore Beaufort and Chukchi oil and gas. This should include providing an opportunity 
to engage all stakeholders in the planning process and to account for multiple uses of the 
marine space that may impact each other. Such a coordination of efforts, perhaps through 
MSP, could result in proactive management and conservation of marine and coastal 
resources while simultaneously allowing for the economic benefits of further development 
in the Arctic region. NGOs can be involved in MSP as stakeholders, but can also serve as 
organizing parties or driving forces for MSP (Calado et al., 2012). Since NGOs play an 
independent role in society, they can help to encourage public participation as organizing 
parties or driving forces in MSP though community organization, training, research, 
education, advocacy, and, by partnering with academic entities and local government 
agencies, can help with project implementation, knowledge transfer, data collection, 
monitoring, and evaluation (Calado et al., 2012).  
One important consideration when exploring MSP as a viable tool for use to 
address the wicked problem of oil and gas development in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas 
is the existing regulatory structure present. In a study comparing the U.S. and Canadian 
regulatory approaches for oil and gas, with the former being characterized by command-
and-control regulations that focus on technology and Canada being characterized by a 
more flexible approach focused on environmental impacts, no significant differences were 
found in the corporate environmental strategies of oil and gas companies operating in 
each of the countries (Sharma, 2001). Further, this study indicated that regulations appear 
to be important drivers of corporate environmental practices at initial stages of planning, 
but other external and internal drivers become stronger influences after these initial 
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stages, suggesting that a combination of both regulatory approaches, more stringent at the 
beginning and more flexible at later stages, may help to produce a higher level of 
environmental protection while still allowing for technological innovation and 
competitiveness among companies (Sharma, 2001). Managi et al. (2005) further 
strengthened support for a regulatory approach that allows for greater technological 
innovation and competitiveness at later stages by showing that, over a 28-year study 
period of environmental regulation and technological change in Gulf of Mexico (GOM) 
offshore oil and gas, technological change was partitioned into roughly 80% in the market 
sector (oil and gas production) and 20% in the environmental sector (Managi, Opaluch, 
Di, & Grigalunas, 2005). In other words, environmental regulation-driven technological 
change resulted in fewer oil spills and greater water quality, but the amount of 
technological change resulting from command-and-control regulations lagged behind the 
amount of change resulting from market forces (i.e., increased oil and gas production) 
(Managi et al., 2005).  These findings suggest that an overly optimistic view of the 
potential of environmental regulations for driving technological change and improved 
environmental quality in offshore oil and gas could lead to poorly designed environmental 
policies (Managi et al., 2005) and the regulatory approach should be flexible enough to 
include opportunities for innovation by companies so that environmental technology can 
keep pace with increased production. In order to avoid severe environmental degradation 
in the Beaufort and Chukchi marine and coastal environments, this more flexible 
regulatory approach for the later stages of oil and gas in the Arctic should be considered 
when developing new planning mechanisms, such as MSP, so that innovative 
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technologies that help maintain a high level of environmental quality are encouraged and 
that opportunities for this innovation to keep pace with the predicted increase in offshore 
production are incorporated into the planning.  
The regulatory structure in the U.S. and Alaska currently allow for public 
participation in the permitting of projects (detailed in section 4), meaning that public 
participation has the potential to shape these permitting requirements. Incorporating 
elements of the wicked problem in development of an MSP process for the Beaufort and 
Chukchi Seas could be one potential option to improve current and future offshore oil and 
gas planning in the region by, among other potential benefits, aiding stakeholders through 
the public participation channels for which the current Federal and State permitting 
process allow. 
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2.  METHODOLOGY 
 
This research reviews current permitting processes that provide insight into the 
Arctic Alaska oil and gas management strategies of the U.S. Federal Government and the 
State of Alaska, one element of the wicked problem of oil and gas development in the 
Beaufort and Chukchi Seas. In addition to an overview of the permitting processes, a 
critical look at the U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region, particularly as it relates to 
planning and permitting of oil and gas development and how the State responds to it, is 
provided. The analysis of these planning and permitting approaches provide insight into 
the priorities that the Federal and State entities consider when deciding whether or not to 
allow particular oil and gas development projects in Alaska’s Beaufort and Chukchi Sea 
coastal and marine areas. 
Further discussion of wicked problem characteristics of Beaufort and Chukchi Sea 
oil and gas development is included to demonstrate the need for an improved 
collaborative decision-making structure for stakeholders, one that balances economic 
interests with environmental protection in the this Arctic marine and coastal environment. 
Suggested improvements to the issue of stakeholder engagement are weighed in the 
context of MSP, which could provide one possible tool to achieve this goal of economic 
development and environmental protection. MSP is a sub-activity of overall sea use 
management and has been promoted as a means to unite stakeholders through long-term, 
policy oriented regional decision-making, implemented through detailed zoning maps, 
zoning regulations, and/or a permit system (Douvere & Ehler, 2009), similar to land use 
36 
 
planning. Rather than a piecemeal, top-down regulatory approach, a proper application of 
MSP could potentially result in a comprehensive bottom-up approach to Arctic offshore 
oil and gas planning that truly engages stakeholders in a meaningful way, instead of 
simply fulfilling legal obligations to allow for public input, helping to avoid adversarial 
struggles, and serving as a method to strive for cooperative stewardship in the Arctic 
region. This qualitative analysis of Federal and State approaches for offshore oil and gas 
permitting in the U.S. Arctic will be further strengthened by examining Rhode Island’s 
Special Area Management Plan (SAMP), the first marine spatial plan in the U.S. to be 
approved by the Federal government as part of a state’s Coastal Zone Management 
Program (CZMP). This case study provides a basis for examining if the approach used in 
Rhode Island and its attempt to incorporate a high level of stakeholder engagement in the 
offshore development planning process could potentially be adapted to improve the 
Federal and State planning for future offshore oil and gas projects in the Beaufort and 
Chukchi Seas. While the MSP used in Rhode Island may have been successful, there are 
many differences to consider for MSP when examining its applicability for the Beaufort 
and Chukchi Seas, an area with an entirely different set of political, social, cultural, 
economic, environmental, and technical factors than Rhode Island. However, the act of 
bringing together stakeholders from various industries and interests is present in the 
Rhode Island case and this example of stakeholder engagement is the focus. 
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 Limitations and assumptions 
 
The Alaska Coastal Management Program (ACMP), a voluntary effort under 
NOAA’s National Coastal Zone Management Program to implement coastal zone plans at 
the State level, expired in 2011 and was not reauthorized by the Alaska State Legislature; 
a ballot initiative to reinstate the program was written in 2012 but was voted down, 
making Alaska the only coastal state in the U.S. currently without a Coastal Zone 
Management Program (CZMP). One proponent of the 2012 ballot initiative, a former 
Alaska governor, argued that the Alaska CZMP had helped to coordinate permitting 
between Federal and State agencies in the past (Knowles, 2012), while one opponent of 
the initiative, another former Alaska governor, argued that the way the 2012 initiative was 
written was entirely different than the original Alaska CZMP, resulting in a program that 
would duplicate efforts of existing State agencies, particularly the Alaska Department of 
Natural Resources (ADNR) (Murkowski, 2012). After the expiration of this State 
program, permitting and oversight of coastal management fell under the responsibility of 
the ADNR, which had existing permitting authority prior to the Alaska CZMP. For this 
reason, there is no single, overarching State coastal management plan to examine in this 
study and hence, State oil and gas permitting, leasing, and authorization requirements 
serve as the substitute. Additionally, the evaluation of the potential use of MSP in the 
Beaufort and Chukchi Seas partially relies on an example from Rhode Island, where MSP 
was incorporated as part of the State CZMP and where there is an entirely different 
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political climate than in Alaska. In order to account for these stark differences, recent 
statements from State agency and industry representatives in Alaska indicating concerns 
about the implementation of MSP in the Alaskan offshore are considered. 
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3.  OVERARCHING LEGAL CONTEXT AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Before discussing the permitting process of the U.S. Federal Government and the 
State of Alaska, it is necessary to survey the overarching legal regimes, treaties, and 
statutes applicable to environmental protection in the Arctic marine environment of the 
Beaufort and Chukchi Seas. In addition, a brief overview of economic forecasts for 
offshore oil and gas development in these areas is provided to describe potential 
development scenarios for the region. These factors play an important role in the oil and 
gas planning process and can dictate where and when resources are developed, 
contributing to the wicked problem. 
 
Legal regimes and statutes 
 
The Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Ilulissat 
Declaration 
 
The Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), 
which concluded in 1982, is a treaty among member nation-states regarding the use of the 
world’s oceans and the jurisdiction of the continental shelves of nations. The treaty, 
among many other provisions, sets forth a boundary for territorial waters—12 nautical 
miles from the nation’s coastline—as well as the EEZ, or Exclusive Economic Zone, 
which extends 200 nautical miles from the nation’s coastline (Attard, 1987). Within the 
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EEZ, the nation-state has exclusive right to the living marine resources and mineral 
resources, and can regulate pollution from ships entering the EEZ for innocent passage. 
Article VI of UNCLOS III establishes the International Seabed Authority (ISA) for the 
regulation and taxation of seabed, ocean floor, and subsoil resources extracted in the high 
seas of the areas outside of the 200 nautical mile EEZ limit ("About Us - International 
Seabed Authority," 2013). The U.S. has signed but not ratified UNCLOS III; however, the 
U.S. follows a policy that is consistent with most parts of the Convention and many key 
norms in UNCLOS III reflect customary international law, binding on all nations (Ripley, 
2011). 
Annex II of UNCLOS III provides an explanation for the method to be used in 
establishing the outer edge of a nation’s continental margin beyond 200 nautical miles and 
is in accordance with Article 76, which establishes a Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf (CLCS) to aid in this determination. The CLCS can recommend the 
delineation of the outer limits of the OCS of an individual nation and this delineation is to 
be established unilaterally; however, the delimitation of any overlapping boundaries 
between coastal nations is to be resolved by treaty between the applicable parties (Ripley, 
2011). Though Russia, Norway, and Denmark have submitted claims for areas in the 
Arctic beyond their 200 nautical mile EEZs to the CLCS, and Canada is expected to do so 
("CLCS: Partial Submission by Canada," 2014), offshore oil and gas development beyond 
the existing EEZs is “highly unlikely during the foreseeable future (Young, 2009; AMAP, 
2007). 
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 One Arctic territorial dispute of concern for the U.S. is that regarding the 
delimitation of its maritime border in the Beaufort Sea with Canada, where an area of 
22,600 km2 rich in fisheries and, likely, oil and gas, is at stake (see Fig. 8) (Kříž & 
Chrášťanský, 2012). The U.S. holds the position that the border has not yet been defined 
and prefers the median approach between the countries, while Canada cites an 1825 
agreement between Great Britain and Russia using the 141st meridian as the border (Kříž 
& Chrášťanský, 2012). This 1825 agreement, however, uses the vague term “as far as 
frozen ocean” in its border demarcation and the date and signatories of the agreement 
raise further questions as to its legal force (Kříž & Chrášťanský, 2012).  
 
 
Figure 8. International borders in the Arctic Ocean. The area in orange indicates the disputed area between 
the U.S. and Canada. (Source: University of Durham) 
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It has been suggested that all territorial disputes in the Arctic Ocean and its adjacent seas 
could be resolved under the legal framework provided by UNCLOS III, though the U.S. is 
the only one of the five states bordering the Arctic Ocean who has not ratified the 
Convention (Ripley, 2011). 
 UNCLOS III provides a general framework for environmental protection in Part 
XII, “Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment.” This framework applies to 
all uses, including the sovereign right of nation-states to conduct oil and gas exploration 
and exploitation on their continental shelves, though nation states have the obligation to 
“protect and preserve the marine environment” (Casper, 2009). These obligations include, 
among other provisions, ensuring that activities in a nation-state’s jurisdiction that result 
in pollution do not cause trans boundary harm and require nation-states to cooperate with 
other nation-states and “competent international organizations” in developing rules, 
standards, best practices, procedures, monitoring requirements, and conducting scientific 
research to aid in the prevention of marine pollution (Casper, 2009). 
 In May 2008, the five Arctic nations that border the Arctic Ocean, Canada, 
Denmark (through its autonomous province of Greenland), Norway, Russia, and the 
United States, met to discuss and sign the Ilulissat Declaration to highlight their position 
as coastal nations with sovereign rights and responsibilities in the Arctic Ocean who were 
committed to following procedures that delimit outer continental shelves. This Danish-led 
initiative was designed to challenge the notion that a new comprehensive international 
legal regime should be established to govern the Arctic Ocean and that the existing legal 
framework under UNCLOS III is sufficient (Dodds, 2013). Absent from this meeting 
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were the other three Arctic states that do not border the Arctic Ocean (Iceland, Finland, 
and Sweden) as well as the aboriginal groups that hold a significant position in the Arctic 
Council, further indicating the force of the claim of the five Arctic littoral nations 
regarding their perceived full jurisdiction over territorial waters and sovereign rights over 
EEZs and OCSs in the Arctic (Dodds, 2013). Though these five Arctic nations intend to 
strongly assert their claims to the natural resources in their respective outer continental 
shelves, this does not mean that the Arctic will necessarily become the site of armed 
conflict.  Many of the existing disputes in the region have lasted for decades without ever 
reaching a crisis point and the 40-year long Russo-Norwegian dispute in the Barents Sea, 
which had often been considered one of the most serious disputes, has been resolved 
recently (Kříž & Chrášťanský, 2012). The remaining disputes, which involve demarcation 
of the maritime borders between several states, the unresolved status of several 
international straits, and the exact boundaries of EEZs and continental shelves in the 
Arctic, are not purely the result of economic interests in the region but also include 
strategic-security questions and matters of national sovereignty and prestige (Kříž & 
Chrášťanský, 2012). As the Arctic continues to increase in importance and attract 
attention from previously inactive players, it is in the best interest of the five Arctic 
littoral nations to work together and swiftly resolve their disputes in a peaceful manner 
(Kříž & Chrášťanský, 2012). Nevertheless, UNCLOS III serves as one of the primary 
reference documents for resolving these territorial disputes and the framework for this 
dispute resolution that it provides remains an important consideration for the United 
States. 
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Part XII of UNCLOS III stipulates that “States have the obligation to protect and 
preserve the marine environment” and should take measures individually, jointly, 
regionally, and globally “to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine 
environment from any source” (Juda, 1996). However, the issue of how to protect the 
marine environment is left up to the environmental policies of each nation-state (Juda, 
1996). The term “pollution of the marine environment” is defined in Article 32 of 
UNCLOS III as  
 
[T]he introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substance or energy into 
the marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result 
in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards 
to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other 
legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and 
reduction of amenities. 
 
In terms of protection of the Arctic marine environment, Article 234 of UNCLOS III 
specifically refers to ice-covered areas of the sea: 
 
Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws 
and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine 
pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the 
exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions 
and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create 
obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the 
marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance 
of the ecological balance. Such laws and regulations shall have due regard 
to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment based on the best available scientific evidence. 
 
Article 234 was largely the result of Canadian negotiating efforts at UNCLOS III to 
protect the waters of the Northwest Passage (NWP) as there was a possibility that oil from 
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the North Slope of Alaska would be transported by ship through the NWP to the US East 
Coast before the TAPS was built (Huebert, 2001). Article 234 indicates that ice-covered 
areas of the sea are unique and require special considerations by nation-states that are 
regulating navigation through their respective EEZs. 
 
Federal statutes 
 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
 
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. §4321 et seq.), or 
NEPA, sets forth the national policy of the U.S. Federal Government for the oversight of 
activities that affect the “harmony between man and his environment.” NEPA allows for 
technical and financial assistance by the U.S. Federal Government, among other means 
and measures, to foster the sustainable use of the natural environment. NEPA requires all 
Federal agencies to develop procedures to determine whether any proposed major Federal 
actions will significantly affect the quality of the human environment and to develop 
alternative courses of action; this process of environmental analysis and consideration of 
alternatives for proposed major actions must be prepared in a detailed statement known as 
Environmental Impact Statements (EISs)("Basic Information - NEPA," 2012). 
The NEPA review process consists of three levels: categorical exclusion (CE) 
determination—if an undertaking meets certain criteria set forth that a Federal agency has 
previously determined as having no significant environmental impact, the undertaking 
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may qualify for a categorical exclusion and not fall under the detailed environmental 
analysis requirement; environmental assessment/finding of no significant impact 
(EA/FONSI)—a Federal agency prepares a written EA to determine if the proposed 
undertaking would significantly affect the environment and, if it is found that it would 
not, a FONSI is issued and no further NEPA review is required; environmental impact 
statement (EIS)—if the EA determined that the undertaking would significantly impact 
the environment or if this was determined before going through the EA  process, the lead 
Federal agency must prepare an EIS describing and evaluating the impacts of the 
proposed action and alternatives ("Basic Information - NEPA," 2012).  
NEPA encourages state participation in NEPA by allowing state agencies or 
officials to prepare these detailed EISs, under the oversight and review of Federal 
officials, if the activity being examined is a major Federal action funded under a program 
of grants to states. In addition, the establishment of the Council on Environmental Quality 
(CEQ) in Section II of the Act requires the President to submit an annual Environmental 
Quality Report to Congress that details the status and condition of major natural, 
manmade, or altered environmental classes of the nation; current and foreseeable trends in 
the quality, management and utilization of these environmental classes with respect to 
social, economic, and other requirements; the adequacy of available natural resources; a 
review of the programs and activities that have an effect on the environment and on the 
conservation, development, and utilization of natural resources; and a program for 
remedying the deficiencies of these programs and activities, with recommendations for 
legislation ("Basic Information - NEPA," 2012). 
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Although the public and other stakeholders can provide input during the EIS 
process and may contest the findings in an EIS, a proposed action may still go forward as 
the NEPA process is procedural rather than substantive, i.e., the due process requires that 
the legal and administrative proceedings were carried out in a fair manner by the agency 
conducting the NEPA review rather than requiring the agency to protect the rights of an 
individual or party through the creation of rules or regulations (Karkkainen, 2002). The 
EIS process has often been criticized as costly, time-consuming, and pointless paper-
shuffling, as NEPA review does not require follow-up and “there is no assurance that 
mitigated impacts remain below EIS-triggering thresholds” (Karkkainen, 2002). 
Conversely, support for NEPA arises largely from the fact that it requires Federal 
agencies to consider the environmental consequences of their actions that they might 
otherwise remain ignorant about until after these consequences occur (Karkkainen, 2002), 
allowing for the development of alternative, less-damaging courses of action. 
 
Clean Air Act 
 
 The Clean Air Act (CAA) (42 U.S.C. §7401 et seq.), first enacted in 1970 and 
later amended in 1977 and 1990, sets forth the goal of identifying airborne contaminants 
and their effects on human health, as well as their overall impact on ecosystems, and 
requires the EPA and other supporting agencies to continue researching these specific 
contaminants in order to update emission standards and requirements as needed ("Clean 
Air Act Requirements and History," 2013). The CAA regulates air emissions from both 
48 
 
stationary and mobile sources and authorizes the EPA to establish National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS) to assist in regulation ("Summary of the Clean Air Act," 
2014). NAAQS at the Federal level is coupled with the development of state 
implementation plans (SIPs) by individual states in order to achieve these Federal 
standards ("Summary of the Clean Air Act," 2014). Section 112 of the CAA was amended 
in 1990 to require technology-based standards for major sources and certain area sources 
("Clean Air Act Requirements and History," 2013). Major sources are defined as “a 
stationary source or group of stationary sources that emit or have the potential to emit 10 
tons per year or more of a hazardous air pollutant or 25 tons per year or more of a 
combination of hazardous air pollutants,” and area sources are defined as stationary 
sources that are not a major source ("Clean Air Act Requirements and History," 2013).  
 
Clean Water Act 
  
The Clean Water Act (CWA) (33 U.S.C. §1251 et seq.), initially called the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act when first enacted in 1948, gained its current name after 
amendments in 1972 ("Summary of the Clean Water Act," 2014). The CWA was 
established with the intent of eliminating the discharge of pollutants into the navigable 
waters of the United States and established the National Pollution Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES) under section 402 in Title IV to oversee the issuance of permits for 
point-source discharge of pollutants that met applicable requirements outlined in the Act. 
Section 404 of the act gives the Army Corps of Engineers the authority to issue permits 
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for the discharge of dredged or fill material into waters at disposal sites. The CWA also 
provides for the allocation of funds for various public works projects related to water 
sanitation and establishes fines and other sanctions for those who violate its provisions 
("Summary of the Clean Water Act," 2014).   
 
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
 
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) (33 U.S.C. §2701 et seq.), which amended 
the Clean Water Act, requires that if vessels or facilities discharge oil into the navigable 
waters of the U.S., the responsible parties are held liable for the cleanup of the discharged 
oil from the waters, wildlife, and shoreline and other affected areas unless the discharge 
was caused by an act of God, an act of war, or an act of omission by a third party if the 
third party is not connected to the responsible party. OPA was enacted as a result of the 
1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound, the largest oil spill in the U.S. at the 
time, and contains a provision that prohibits vessels that have caused an oil spill of more 
than 1 million U.S. gallons from entering Prince William Sound ("Oil Pollution Act 
Overview," 2014). OPA is proactive in its approach, with the goal of protecting the 
marine environment so that risks are reduced or eliminated. OPA requires government 
and industry to create contingency plans to prepare for oil spill events and this 
contingency planning has taken a three-tiered approach: the Federal government is 
required to direct public and private spill response efforts; Federal, State, and local 
governments form Area Committees to develop location-specific Area Contingency 
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Plans; and owners and operators of vessels are required to develop Facility Response 
Plans for the prevention of oil discharges into the navigable waters as well as containment 
and cleanup of such discharges ("Oil Pollution Act Overview," 2014). Additionally, OPA 
created the Federal Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund to provide up to one billion dollars per 
spill incident to assist with cleanup efforts ("Oil Pollution Act Overview," 2014). 
 
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
 
 The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) (43 U.S.C. §1331 et seq.) 
defines the OCS as the submerged lands seaward of three miles and until 200 nautical 
miles from a state’s coastline as under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Government and 
requires the Secretary of the Interior to administer mineral exploration and development 
of the OCS ("OCS Lands Act History," n.d.). The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management 
(BOEM) carries out these duties through its oil and gas exploration and development 
program, granting leases to the highest bidder. The OCSLA requires BOEM to collect and 
consider environmental impacts and relevant scientific information when developing five-
year offshore leasing programs, as well as during other planning and management 
activities (Spies, 2013). 
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Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
 
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) (16 U.S.C. §701 et seq.) combines and 
implements various treaties and conventions between the U.S. and Canada, Japan, 
Mexico, and the former U.S.S.R. for the protection of migratory birds ("Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act Overview," 2014).  The MBTA makes the taking, killing, or possessing of 
migratory birds unlawful in the U.S. This includes making it unlawful to pursue, hunt, 
take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to 
barter, barter, offer to purchase, purchase, deliver for shipment, ship, export, import, cause 
to be shipped, exported, or imported, deliver for transportation, transport or cause to be 
transported, carry or cause to be carried, or receive for shipment, transportation, carriage 
or export, any migratory bird, any part, nest, or eggs of any such bird that is native to the 
United States or its territories. Exceptions to this statute include the breeding of migratory 
game birds on farms and preserves for the purpose of increasing the food supply and the 
seasonal taking of migratory birds by indigenous Alaskans for subsistence purposes. 
Authority to oversee that the components of this treaty are carried out in the United States 
is given to the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, who issues permits for activities that may 
impact migratory birds. 
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Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 
 
The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA) (16 U.S.C. §§1361-1383b, 
1401-1406, 1411-1421h) makes it unlawful to take marine mammals and the term “take” 
is defined as “to harass, hunt, capture, collect or kill, or attempt to harass, hunt, capture, 
collect or kill any marine mammal” (18 USC §1362); however, the law contains 
provisions for subsistence hunting of marine mammals by Alaska Natives. This definition 
of “take” has been interpreted broadly and has led to increasing litigation, particularly as 
to what constitutes “harassment” of marine mammals, and it is important to note that 
“take” does not necessarily mean an action that results in the lethal killing of a marine 
mammal (see Appendix A for a timeline of recent final rules from Federal agencies and 
major court cases related to the issue). 
The Beaufort and Chukchi Seas are home to a wide array of marine mammal 
species, some of which call the region their permanent home (e.g., seals, polar bears, and 
walrus) while others migrate through the region on a seasonal basis (e.g., whales). The 
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) National Marine 
Fisheries Service (NMFS) issues permits related to interactions with cetaceans and 
pinnipeds protected under the MMPA and the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) is 
charged with issuing these permits as they pertain to walruses and polar bears protected 
under the MMPA. 
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Endangered Species Act 
 
In addition to the MBTA and MMPA, the other major statute governing wildlife is 
the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) (7 U.S.C. § 136, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq.). 
The ESA allows for a formal process to identify species that are in danger of becoming 
threatened or endangered and to put in place conservation measures to help ensure the 
survival of these species that have become imperiled due to anthropogenic activities. In 
order for a species to be listed under the ESA, the species must fall under one of the 
criteria in Section 4(a): the present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment 
of its habitat or range; overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or 
educational purposes; disease or predation; the inadequacy of existing regulatory 
mechanisms; or other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued existence. There 
are several species listed as threatened or endangered (collectively known as T&E 
species) under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) that are commonly found in the Arctic. 
For offshore oil and gas projects, additional consideration must be given for these T& E 
species, as they have a higher protection status. The bowhead whale (Balaena mysticetus) 
is an endangered species commonly found in the Arctic that is particularly important for 
subsistence hunting by Alaska Natives; other marine mammal species listed as 
endangered and that can be found in Arctic Alaska include the humpback whale 
(Megaptera novaeangliae), fin whale (Balaenoptera physalus), and North Pacific right 
whale (Eubalaena japonica) ("Endangered, Threatened, and Candidate Species under 
NMFS' Authority in Alaska," 2013). The spectacled eider (Somateria fischeri), Stellar’s 
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eider (Polysticta stelleri), polar bear (Ursus maritimus), ringed seal (Phoca hispida), and 
bearded seal Beringia distinct population segment (DPS) (Erignathus barbatus), also 
found in the Arctic, are currently listed as threatened (Areawide Lease Mitigation 
Measures: Beaufort Sea, n.d.)("Endangered, Threatened, and Candidate Species under 
NMFS' Authority in Alaska," 2013). 
 
Economic considerations 
 
 Lindholt & Glomsrød (2012), in a paper titled “The Arctic: No big bonanza for the 
global petroleum industry,” use a reference scenario from the International Energy 
Agency’s (IEA) 2009 World Energy Outlook global oil price and 2008 USGS resource 
estimates to analyze how future oil and gas production in the Arctic might develop from 
2010-2050. The IEA global oil price forecast that the authors use projects the real oil price 
to rise to 100 USD by 2020 and 115 USD by 2030 (prices in BOE, or barrel of oil 
equivalent) and is lower than that given by the U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(EIA) in 2010 but higher than the trajectory made by OPEC’s 2010 World Oil Outlook 
(Lindholt & Glomsrød, 2012). The authors use a model that does not account for 
fluctuations in the market from price turmoil due to political uprisings or similar events, 
and assume that oil and gas companies have full access to all areas that contain petroleum 
(i.e., that there are no political or environmental constraints); however, the model does 
take into account the significant long term issue for the conventional global petroleum 
market of a rapidly-growing supply of unconventional oil and gas reserves, such as the oil 
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sands in Canada and shale gas in the U.S., by using estimates from the National Petroleum 
Council’s (NPC) 2007 report (Lindholt & Glomsrød, 2012). Considering the resource 
estimates of the five largest Arctic oil producing countries (Russia, Alaska, Greenland, 
Canada, and Norway), the authors point out that Arctic Russia dominates in terms of total 
undiscovered Arctic oil and gas reserves, while Alaska follows in second (Lindholt & 
Glomsrød, 2012). One important difference between Russia and the other West Arctic 
countries in the study is that Russia’s reserves are largely controlled by state-owned 
national oil companies while the West Arctic regions allow private international oil 
companies (IOCs) to buy licenses to obtain access to the petroleum reserves present there, 
allowing for greater competition in the free-market system (Lindholt & Glomsrød, 2012). 
While Russia is predicted to remain the largest producer of Arctic oil and gas, and other 
regions globally are predicted to allow for cheaper gas production than in the Arctic, 
Lindholt & Glomsrod’s (2012) results show that the West Arctic regions, particularly 
Alaska and Greenland, will experience an upswing in total oil and gas production toward 
the end of the 2010-2050 timeframe, especially after 2020 for Alaska and 2035 for 
Greenland, though these results are highly dependent on the currently estimated 
undiscovered resources becoming proven reserves.  
While global oil prices and demand play a determining role in Arctic oil and gas 
production, other complex factors such as climate change and environmental regulation 
can influence Arctic exploration leading to production. Arctic exploration is already well 
underway, mainly in the U.S. and Russian portions, and current production statistics 
combined with planned, new capital projects for future production of major oil and gas 
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companies in the Arctic indicate that IOCs are conservative in terms of extracting new 
resources in the Arctic due to technical challenges, risks, and costs, though their continued 
investment in the Arctic indicates that these companies wish to maintain the resources in 
the region as an important part of their portfolios (Ermida, 2014). With this in mind, it is 
important to consider how the current regulatory process is set up in the Arctic and how it 
could be improved to accommodate long-term continued oil and gas production in the 
region.  In this research, the scope of this regulatory process is limited to the U.S. portion 
of the Arctic.  
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4. CURRENT AD HOC PERMITTING STRUCTURE 
 
The current planning and permitting processes for U.S. and State of Alaska 
offshore oil and gas are complex and responsibilities are divided among a multitude of 
agencies. For the purposes of this study, the focus is on the strategies for the management 
of offshore development and the issuance of permits as they relate to protection of the 
marine environment and will not include those permits required for operational safety, in 
compliance with OSHA and other agencies, designed to protect human safety. There are 
multiple sources of oil and gas-specific industrial activities that could affect the integrity 
of the Arctic marine environment: geological & geophysical (G&G) exploration by 
vessels (which involve seismic surveying and drilling), icebreakers, construction of in-
water structures such as drilling platforms, and subsea pipeline construction, among 
others. For this reason, it is necessary to look at the current regulations of the U.S. Federal 
Government and State of Alaska for the permitting of these activities related to 
infrastructure development and drilling. Industry standards developed independently or in 
conjunction with regulatory agencies are also a key component of safety and 
environmental protection and consideration of this technical aspect should be incorporated 
into the permitting process, though such industry standards are not addressed in this 
analysis. 
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Federal permitting 
 
The Department of the Interior has authority under the Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act (OCSLA) to grant leases to the highest bidder for the exploration, 
development, and production of oil and gas in the OCS, the area of the marine space 
under Federal jurisdiction. BOEM carries out this task by periodically holding lease sales 
of the submerged lands of the OCS. BOEM was established after the dissolution of the 
Minerals Management Service (MMS) by Secretarial Order No. 3299 in 2010 (Salazar, 
2010). The former MMS was embroiled in scandal in 2008 following the release of a DOI 
inspector general report that revealed ethical lapses and various conflicts of interest; the 
MMS was further implicated in mismanagement following the Deepwater Horizon 
incident that resulted in the firing of its director and a complete restructuring of the 
agency, which was renamed the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and 
Enforcement (BOEMRE) (Hogue, 2010). BOEMRE was subdivided into three 
independent agencies by Secretarial Order No. 3299 to account for the three distinct, 
conflicting missions of the former MMS: 1) energy leasing and development—which falls 
under BOEM’s authority, 2) effective enforcement—the task of the Bureau of Safety and 
Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), and 3) revenue collection—the task of the Office of 
Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR) (Hogue, 2010).  BOEM is also the agency 
responsible for overseeing activities requiring NEPA review during the Five Year Plan 
and lease sale process.  
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Upon being granted a lease by BOEM, the winning bidder may apply for permits 
to carry out exploration, development, and production activities ("Alaska Leasing Office," 
2014). BOEM manages lease sales through the creation of Five Year OCS oil and gas 
leasing programs to determine the size, timing, and location of each lease block; each Five 
Year Program must be approved by the Secretary of the Interior before any lease sales 
begin. Figure 9 shows current lease owners in the Beaufort and Chukchi Sea portions of 
the Arctic Alaska OCS. 
 
 
Figure 9. Current Arctic Alaska OCS lease blocks by owners. Shell Gulf of Mexico, Inc. is currently one of 
the largest lease holders in the region, holding the majority of lease blocks in the Chukchi Sea Planning 
Area. (Source: BOEM) 
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Section 18 of the OCSLA lays out the major steps to be considered in the Five Year plans 
including potential environmental damage and impacts on the coastal zone, sufficient time 
for public comment, and submission of the plan to the governors of affected states who 
may, in turn, notify relevant local governments in their states of the proposed lease sales 
before they begin (43 USC §1331).  
 
             
Figure 10. BOEM oil and gas leasing. (Left) BOEM process for offshore development in the OCS. This 
process begins with the Five Year Program before a NOI (notice of intent to file an EIS) is issued. The EIS 
is first released as a draft (DEIS) for public comment before a final (FEIS) version is issued. A proposed 
notice of sale (PNOS) for lease blocks is released for public comment before a final notice of sale (FNOS) is 
issued. Companies who are granted leases must submit exploration and development plans to BOEM for 
review before these activities can occur. (Right) the 2012-2017 lease sale schedule for the U.S. OCS, with 
planned Alaska OCS lease sales in yellow. (Source: BOEM) 
 
 
After the Five Year Program has reached final approval, lease sales can begin. 
BOEM issued 237 leases covering 1.28 million acres in the Beaufort Sea from 2003-2007; 
in 2008, 487 leases in the Chukchi Sea totaling 2.7 million acres were granted, drawing 
$2.66 billion in high bids accepted—a record for Alaska (see Appendix B for all historical 
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lease sales in the Alaska OCS) (Conley, Pumphrey, Toland, & David, 2013)("Lease Sales, 
Alaska OCS Region," 2014). New lease sales in the Alaska OCS will not be held again 
until 2016 for the Chukchi Sea and 2017 for the Beaufort Sea planning area (see Fig. 10). 
Subsistence hunting and fishing in the Beaufort and Chukchi are high and one 
study found that 26 % of respondents in the Arctic region rely on subsistence for at least 
half of their food and for another 27%, subsistence accounts for 25-50% of their food 
supply ("Inventory of Environmental and Social Resource Categories Along the U.S. 
Coast," 2012). Taking this high subsistence use into account, the 2012-2017 Program 
excludes from leasing a 25-mile stretch along the Chukchi coastline that serves as an 
important subsistence area, as well as two whaling areas near Barrow and Kaktovik in the 
Beaufort (Conley et al., 2013). Prior to the granting of leases, BOEM is also responsible 
for the regulation of pre-lease G&G activities to coordinate exploration and scientific 
research activities in the OCS. Geological permits require the applicant to provide a 
description of drilling methods or sampling; equipment to be used; estimated bore holes 
or sample locations; navigation system; method of sampling; description of analyzed or 
processed data; estimated completion date; and a map, plat, or chart showing latitude and 
longitude, specific block numbers, and total number of borings and samples ("Regulation 
of Pre-lease Exploration," 2014). Geophysical permits require identification of vessel 
information for seismic surveys; a description of the energy source and receiving array; 
total energy output; number of impulses per linear miles; towing depth; navigation system 
to be used; estimate of area to be surveyed; description of final processing; estimated 
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completion date; and a map, plat or chart showing latitude, longitude, block numbers, 
total line miles or blocks proposed ("Regulation of Pre-lease Exploration," 2014).  
BOEM tracks G&G permits by calendar year; the Gulf of Mexico Region (GOM) 
has issued 82% of permits while the Alaska Region follows with 9%, reflecting trends 
with fluctuations in the price of petroleum, regional differences relating to leasing 
moratoria, and operating conditions (see Appendix A for BOEM’s G&G permitting 
flowchart) ("Regulation of Pre-lease Exploration," 2014). From 1982-2008, there were a 
series of congressional and presidential moratoriums that prohibited oil and gas 
development in most of the U.S. OCS apart from areas in the GOM and Arctic 
("Background on Offshore Drilling and Moratoriums," 2013). After the Deepwater 
Horizon incident, the Obama Administration issued an order to halt all deepwater drilling 
in the OCS, though this was blocked by a Federal judge and an appeal issued by the 
Obama Administration was denied by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. After this appeal 
was denied, Secretary of the Department of the Interior Ken Salazar issued a directive to 
suspend deepwater drilling through November 30, 2010, on facilities that use subsea 
blowout preventers or surface blowout preventers on floating facilities. These moratoria, 
as well as the overall higher costs and longer lead times of drilling in the Arctic (Harsem 
et al., 2011), show that the disparity between the number of permits issued in GOM and 
Alaska are reasonable. After being granted a lease, a company must produce and submit 
an Exploration Plan (EP) and a Development Operations Coordination Document 
(DOCD) to BOEM for review with applicable regulations and standards before 
exploration and development may continue. 
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 BOEM’s counterpart, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement 
(BSEE), is primarily responsible for permitting, environmental compliance, conservation 
compliance, engineering standards and regulations, oil spill response planning, 
inspections, enforcement, and investigations of offshore oil and gas projects (MOA 
between BOEM and BSEE: Plans and Permits, 2011). Permits issued by BSEE include 
those for drilling; modifying approved wells; installations, modifications/repairs, and 
removals of platforms and structures; pipeline Rights-of-Way (ROWs); and installations, 
modifications/repairs of pipelines on lease and transportation pipelines across leased and 
unleased blocks (MOA between BOEM and BSEE: Plans and Permits, 2011). Offshore 
structures and pipelines under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior are 
required to have a Worst Case Discharge (WCD) scenario and be included on an Oil Spill 
Response Plan (OSRP) when these permits are reviewed for approval (MOA between 
BOEM and BSEE: Plans and Permits, 2011). 
 In terms of water quality, EPA Region 10 is responsible for issuing NPDES 
permits as required by the CWA for the discharge of effluents, monitoring requirements, 
and other conditions for offshore oil and gas exploration and development in the U.S. 
Arctic OCS. The Arctic offshore currently has two general NPDES permits, one for the 
Beaufort Sea area and one for the Chukchi Sea area, for OCS geotechnical surveys and 
related activities. These surveys are conducted to assess geologic stability for potential 
placement of offshore oil and gas structures and regulate discharges of certain allowable 
effluents as described in the accompanying Ocean Discharge Criteria Evaluation (Draft 
Ocean Discharge Criteria Evaluation for Oil and Gas Geotechnical Surveys and Related 
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Activities in Federal Waters of the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, Alaska, 2013). One of the 
most notable CWA violations in the offshore oil and gas industry came as a result of the 
Macondo Well blowout and loss of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico 
in April 2010. At the time of the explosion and sinking, BP contracted with Transocean, 
the owner and operator of the Deepwater Horizon, including its blowout preventer and 
riser ("Transocean Settlement," 2012). As part of the settlement, Transocean agreed to $1 
billion in civil penalties and $400 million in criminal penalties ("Transocean Settlement," 
2012). 
In addition to issuance of NPDES permits by the EPA for the CWA, the USACE 
issues permits for dredging activities that could impact water quality. Section 10 permits 
are needed if construction, excavation, or deposition of material is in, over, or under 
navigable waters, or for any work which would affect the course, location, condition, or 
capacity of navigable waters. A Section 404 permit may also be required for authorizing 
the discharge of dredged and fill material into waters and wetlands of the United States 
(Areawide Lease Mitigation Measures: Beaufort Sea, n.d.). 
Permits related to the MMPA may be required from NMFS (pinnipeds and 
cetaceans) or USFWS (walruses and polar bears). NMFS issues incidental 
harassment/take permits for scientific research, activities enhancing the survival or 
recovery of a marine mammal species or stock, commercial and educational photography, 
first-time import for public display, capture of wild marine mammals for public display, 
incidental take during commercial fishing operations, and incidental take during non-
fishery commercial activities ("Overview of Marine Mammal Permits," 2013). USFWS 
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issues similar permits for the respective species under its jurisdiction. For offshore oil and 
gas activities, the most commonly issued permits under the MMPA are Incidental 
Harassment Authorizations (IHAs), usually for seismic surveys, and Letters of 
Authorization (LOAs) that authorize “incidental take” of a “small number” of marine 
mammals that would have no more than a “negligible impact” on those species not listed 
under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and would not have an “unmitagable adverse 
impact” on subsistence harvest of these species ("Incidental Take Authorizations," 2014). 
These IHAs and LOAs often include requirements for mitigation measures and 
monitoring requirements. In 2013, NOAA, as the lead agency, updated an initial draft EIS 
examining the effects of Beaufort and Chukchi oil and gas activities on marine mammals 
and the Alaska Native communities who rely on these marine mammals for subsistence 
living. In the Supplemental Draft EIS, Arctic-specific measures that NOAA could 
implement for issuing incidental take authorization permits were examined, including 
ways to minimize potential harmful effects from industry-generated noise, accidental 
discharge of pollutants, and the increased presence of ships due to oil and gas activities; 
among the measures suggested was the closing of areas to exploration during whale 
migration and feeding and during traditional subsistence whale and seal hunts (Barclay, 
2013). Recent litigation surrounding the MMPA has focused on the meaning of “small 
numbers,” the sufficiency of mitigation and monitoring efforts, and other scientific 
challenges, such as assessing cumulative impacts to polar bears in the context of IHAs 
("Alaska Oil and Gas Activities," 2013). In 2010, a coalition of environmental NGOs filed 
a lawsuit against the Dept. of the Interior (NRDC v. Jewell) claiming that the Interior 
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failed to require proper mitigation measures for seismic airgun surveys in the Gulf of 
Mexico. The settlement reached in 2013 requires more stringent mitigation measures for 
seismic airgun surveys, including among other things, a prohibition on airguns in 
biologically important areas and a mandatory minimum separation distance between 
surveys ("Landmark Agreement to Protect Gulf of Mexico Whales, Dolphins from 
Industry’s High-Intensity Airgun Surveys," 2013). 
For proposed Federal actions that may affect T&E species or designated critical 
habitat, the ESA requires Federal agencies to consult with NMFS and USFWS; BOEM 
prepares Biological Evaluations to evaluate such proposed actions and NMFS and 
USFWS prepare Biological Opinions (BOs) to identify any mitigation measures to be 
implemented by BOEM ("Biological Opinions & Evaluations Endangered Species Act 
Section 7 Consultations," n.d.).  
The Arctic is also host to a wide array of migratory bird species, particularly 
during the summer months.  For this reason, permits issued by USFWS related to the 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) may be necessary for projects that could result in an 
adverse impact on migratory birds. The MBTA was used to prosecute Exxon following 
the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989 and is a stricter wildlife statute than the MMPA and 
ESA because the prosecution does not have to show that defendant(s) intended to harm 
wildlife or prove that the defendant(s) knew their actions would lead to an oil spill but 
merely prove that the defendant was responsible for the harm (Alexander, 2010).  
Air permitting under the CAA for oil and gas activities in the Federal waters of the 
Alaska OCS was transferred from EPA to BOEM by the Consolidated Appropriations 
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Act, 2012, and companies now submit proposed emissions for facilities in the Beaufort 
OCS or Chukchi OCS as part of the prerequisite to BOEM approval of their exploration 
plan or development and production plan ("Alaska OCS Region - Air Quality 
Jurisdiction," 2014). Shell, as one of the largest lease holders in the Chukchi Sea, 
encountered several issues related to CAA permitting during Arctic exploratory drilling 
operations (Skadowski, 2013). Prior to the transfer of air permitting jurisdiction from EPA 
to BOEM for the Alaska OCS, Shell had been issued CAA permits by the EPA and was 
found to be in violation of these permits during exploratory activities in the Beaufort and 
Chukchi Seas during the 2012 drilling season (Skadowski, 2013). These permits set 
emission limits, pollution control requirements, and monitoring, recordkeeping, and 
reporting requirements on the vessels and their support fleets of icebreakers, spill 
response vessels, and supply ships (Skadowski, 2013). Settlements for the violations were 
reached in 2013 and resulted in Shell paying a $710,000 penalty for violations of the 
Discoverer drill ship air permit and a $390,000 penalty for violations of the Kulluk drill 
ship air permit (Skadowski, 2013). The Dept. of the Interior, of which BOEM is under, 
has not updated its substantive air quality regulations since 1988 and is the process of 
developing a proposal to amend its current oil and gas air quality regulations, to 
accommodate its recently acquired Clean Air Act permitting authority for the Alaska OCS 
(Gomez, 2014). 
 
68 
 
 
Figure 11. Major permits issued by Federal agencies for offshore oil and gas.  Other permits may be 
required than those listed and it is important to note that many of the permits issued after lease sales are 
completed can be issued simultaneously to each other or in varying order. 
  
 
As demonstrated above, the Federal environmental permitting process is largely 
divided up by media (i.e., submerged land use, water quality, wildlife, air) through the 
various regulatory agencies (see Fig. 11). What, then, is the unitive strategy behind these 
somewhat disparate permitting groups? How effective will this media-by-media strategy 
be at protecting the Beaufort and Chukchi marine environments if Arctic Alaska OCS 
development begins to move at a faster pace, with various competing interests vying for 
permits? 
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The overall executive strategy of the U.S. Government can play an important role 
in the pace of Arctic development in the OCS and the permitting process of the regulatory 
agencies often reflects this. Prior to the May 2013 release of the White House’s National 
Strategy for the Arctic Region (NSAR), the U.S. was the only Arctic nation without an 
explicit Arctic policy statement (Bradner, 2013). The NSAR document identifies three 
lines of effort: 1) advancing U.S. security interests; 2) pursuing responsible Arctic region 
stewardship; and 3) strengthening international cooperation. The approach is based on 
safeguarding peace and stability, making decisions using the best available information, 
pursuing innovative arrangements, and by consulting and coordinating with Alaska 
Natives (National Strategy for the Arctic Region, 2013). Although the NSAR briefly 
mentions that the U.S. will continue to “responsibly develop Arctic oil and gas resources,” 
the strategy is rather vague and lacks any clear commitments that the Federal government 
will make regarding the Arctic.  State officials, who met in Alaska with senior Federal 
officials from the various regulatory agencies and a top White House official one month 
after the NSAR was released, were concerned at the lack of substance in the policy and 
that the State’s role as an equal and sovereign partner in further development of Arctic 
policy was not assured; the Deputy Commissioner of the ADNR cited the fact that 
examples set by the Interagency Working Group for the Coordination of Domestic Energy 
Development and Permitting in Alaska, a Federal group of which the State is supposed to 
be a part, demonstrated a failure by the Federal government to fully include Alaska on 
decision-making (Bradner, 2013). Thus, it appears that improvements are needed to bring 
the Federal and State players into a strategy in which there is a mutual planning process 
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with open lines of communication for all stakeholders concerning Beaufort and Chukchi 
oil and gas development. 
 
State permitting 
 
Alaska is the only state in the nation with a separate article in its constitution that 
exclusively addresses natural resources (Todd, 2001), demonstrating the value that it 
places on responsible natural resource development. Article VIII of the Alaska 
Constitution charges the State legislature with the task of providing “for the utilization, 
development, and conservation of all natural resources belonging to the State, including 
land and waters, for the maximum benefit of its people” and that “[f]ish, forests, wildlife, 
grasslands, and all other replenishable resources belonging to the State shall be utilized, 
developed, and maintained on the sustained yield principle, subject to preferences among 
beneficial uses.” 
The ADNR Division of Oil and Gas is the lead agency for lease sales within the 
State’s three mile offshore limit and AS 38.05.180 of the Alaska Land Act tasks the 
commissioner to submit a new Five-Year Oil and Gas Leasing Program to the Alaska 
State Legislature every January (ADNR Division of Oil and Gas Website, 2013). The 
ADNR calls for public input of significant new information from reports, data, and 
research on an annual basis before going through with a lease sale, determining whether 
or not the new information is substantial enough to require a supplement for the proposed 
lease area (Five-Year Program of Proposed Oil and Gas Lease Sales, 2014).  
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Figure 12. General State of Alaska oil and gas leasing areas for 2014-2018.  Note the Beaufort Sea leasing 
area in orange. (Source: ADNR) 
 
 
The 2014 Five-Year Program states that the annual lease sales allow for a 
predictable and stable oil and gas leasing program resulting in a shortened time between 
the sale of a lease and exploration; additionally, the Program claims that this method also 
allows smaller oil and gas companies and individuals to purchase leases in areas of less 
interest to the major oil companies, increasing the competition. Since the Beaufort Sea 
leasing region (see Fig. 12) was added to the annual leasing program in 2000, there have 
been 14 lease sales held (Five-Year Program of Proposed Oil and Gas Lease Sales, 
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2014). Currently, the ADNR does not hold lease sales for its State waters in the Chukchi 
Sea.  The ADNR does not determine the official ownership of lands within a tract until 
after a lease sale occurs, eliminating the need to determine ownership for tracts that do not 
receive bids (Five-Year Program, 2013). In Alaska State waters, the presence of small 
islands in the Beaufort Sea result in a complex boundary between Federal and State 
submerged lands (see Fig. 13).   
 
 
Figure 13. North Slope production units.  This map of active North Slope oil and gas units indicates the 
Alaska Seaward Boundary (three-mile State territorial water limit) by the blue line. (Source: ADNR 
DO&G) 
 
 
The State completes best interest findings every 10 years for each leasing region; 
these best interest findings reports weigh the net positive and negative effects of proposed 
lease sales and discuss the impacts on the area's fish and wildlife, historic and cultural 
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resources, and communities. The purpose of these studies is to aid in determining whether 
the lease, sale, or disposal of oil and gas lease tracts is in the State’s best interest. The last 
best interest finding for the Beaufort Sea area was completed in 2009 with the next best 
interest finding due in 2019 (Five-Year Program of Proposed Oil and Gas Lease Sales, 
2014).   
After leases have been granted, the Permitting and Compliance Unit of the DO&G 
approves plans of operations for oil and gas activities, G&G exploration permits, and 
miscellaneous land use permits for State lands and waters. Each Plan of Operation must 
identify the sites for planned activities and the specific measures, design criteria, 
construction method, and operational standards to be employed as well as potential 
geophysical hazards. AS 38.05.035(e) of the Alaska Land Act, describing the powers and 
duties of the director of the Alaska Department of Natural Resources and the departmental 
delegation of authority, provide the DO&G director the power to mandate mitigation 
measures for exploration, construction, and production; these mitigation measures have 
been developed upon review of terms in earlier competitive lease sales in addition to 
comments and information submitted by the public, local governments, environmental 
organizations, and other Federal, State, and local agencies (ADNR Division of Oil and 
Gas Website, 2013). After a plan of operations is submitted with proposed mitigation 
measures, additional measures will likely be imposed and the most recent required 
mitigation measures will be applied to all operations under that plan, regardless of when 
the lease was issued (ADNR Division of Oil and Gas Website, 2013). The required 
mitigation measures for the Beaufort Sea leasing area include restrictions on construction 
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and placement of facilities; operating requirements; consideration of fish and wildlife 
habitat; consideration of subsistence, commercial, and sport harvest activities; spill 
prevention measures and waste management; access restrictions; consideration of 
prehistoric, historic, and archaeological sites; local hire efforts and communication and 
training initiatives (Areawide Lease Mitigation Measures: Beaufort Sea, n.d.). These 
measures are in addition to any regulatory requirements of the Federal and state 
governments. 
 The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation’s (ADEC) Division of 
Water is developing a CWA permit for discharges under its Alaska Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (APDES) program authority; this permit includes an Ocean Discharge 
Criteria Evaluation (ODCE) detailing the authorized discharges, similar to the Federal 
EPA model (Draft Ocean Discharge Criteria Evaluation for Oil and Gas Geotechnical 
Surveys and Related Activities in Federal Waters of the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, 
Alaska, 2013). ADEC was granted permitting authority from the EPA for wastewater 
discharges within State waters through a four phase process beginning in 2008; the fourth 
and final phase, which included wastewater permitting for oil and gas activities, was 
completed in 2012 ("Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation Assumes 
Wastewater Discharge Permitting from the Environmental Protection Agency," 2012). 
Under APDES, ADEC can issue both general (for planning areas) and individual (for 
specific locations within planning areas) permits for wastewater discharges. 
While most wildlife permits for Arctic offshore oil and gas are granted by the 
Federal agencies NMFS and USFWS, Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADF&G) 
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has statutory authority under AS 16.05.841-871 of the Fish and Game Code to issue 
permits for activities occurring near freshwater anadromous fish habitat, ensuring free 
passage for anadromous and resident fish in fresh water bodies; ADF&G also has 
authority under AS 16.20, detailing the conservation and protection of Alaska fish and 
game, to issue special area permits for activities that occur in a legislatively designated 
Special Area (i.e., refuge, sanctuary, or critical habitat area—see Fig. 14) ("Land & Water 
Use ", 2014). While there are not any of these State-designated Special Areas in the Arctic 
Beaufort and Chukchi Sea areas, there may still be ADF&G permits required for offshore 
oil and gas projects in these areas pertaining to fish passage. 
Section 110 of the CAA (42 U.S.C. §7410) requires state and local air pollution 
control agencies to adopt a Federally-approved strategy to improve air quality, known as a 
State Implementation Plan (SIP). The ADEC Div. of Air Quality is charged with 
establishing this SIP and issues permits under Title I and Title V of the Clean Air Act for 
projects occurring in state boundaries. 
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Figure 14. Alaska Refuges, Sanctuaries, Critical Habitat Areas & Wildlife Ranges.  Blue triangles: refuges, 
yellow triangles: critical habitat areas, red squares: sanctuaries, grey squares: State ranges. (Source: ADFG) 
 
 
Title I permits are for air construction permits and minor source specific permits while 
Title V permits include operating permits, along with permit avoidance approvals such as 
owner requested limits and pre-approved emission limits ("Air Permit Program," 2011). 
Title I construction permits are legal documents that the source must follow, specifying 
when construction is allowed, what emission limits must be met, how often the source can 
be operated, and contain conditions to ensure that sources follow the permit requirements 
through monitoring, record keeping, and reporting requirements ("Permit Information 
Page," 2011). Title V operating permits are issued after the source has begun to operate 
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and must consolidate all of the applicable requirements for the operating facility into one 
document ("Permit Information Page," 2011).  
The State permitting process reflects the media-by-media approach of the Federal 
permitting process, partially due to the fact that the State must comply with Federal laws.  
See Figure 15 for a chart of the major State permits required. 
Upon release of the National Strategy for the Arctic Region, Alaska Governor 
Sean Parnell provided the following comment: “[w]hile there are no concrete 
commitments in the strategy released today, we welcome the White House’s 
acknowledgement that the Arctic will play a significant role in our nation’s future. Alaska 
is America’s Arctic, and we look forward to having a prominent role working with the 
Federal government on these issues that will improve the lives of Alaskans and move the 
United States back into a leadership role among Arctic nations”("Governor Comments on 
National Arctic Strategy," 2013). This statement summarizes the value the State of Alaska 
places on its role within the overall national Arctic strategy, indicating that the State 
intends to be highly involved throughout any Beaufort and Chukchi planning and 
development activities in the coming decades and demonstrates the need for a more 
effective cooperative partnership between the Federal and State entities involved in Arctic 
oil and gas planning. The State of Alaska realizes that the continued production of oil and 
gas is vital to its economic health and will continue to pursue further development in the 
Arctic. 
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Figure 15. State permits and requirements for offshore oil & gas development.  This chart does not include 
all permits that may be required and permits after lease sales may not be issued in this order. 
 
 
 
Federal and State interaction 
 
The Arctic plays a significant role in the State of Alaska’s economy and the State 
has a long history of natural resource planning and development in the Arctic. Onshore oil 
and gas development in Prudhoe Bay and the surrounding areas is currently the highest 
producing region in the North American Arctic, with Russia’s West Siberian Basin as the 
highest producing in the entire Arctic (see Fig. 16)  (Keil, 2014). Global markets are a 
determining factor in where and when oil and gas is developed and, as mentioned in 
Section 3, Economic considerations, domestic unconventional oil and gas resources in 
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North America have challenged the dominance of conventional oil and gas, including 
offshore deposits. Arctic oil and gas resources are not expected to become a major 
component of U.S. production; however, the importance of Arctic oil and gas remains an 
important aspect in the long-term energy portfolio of oil companies, the State of Alaska, 
and the U.S. (especially with the U.S. goal of becoming less dependent on oil imports) 
(Keil, 2014) and will continue to be a hotly debated subject.  
 
 
Figure 16. Major basins in the Arctic Ocean.  For the North American portion of the Arctic, the Arctic 
Alaska region is estimated to hold the largest undiscovered Arctic oil deposits, about 30 billion barrels.  The 
second largest oil province in the Arctic is the Amerasia Basin, located just north of Canada, and estimated 
to have about 9.7 billion barrels of undiscovered oil (USGS estimates). (Source: 
http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/analysispaper/arctic/. Image: EIA) 
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As demonstrated previously, estimated oil and gas deposits in the Beaufort and 
Chukchi are evenly divided between Federal and State jurisdictional boundaries and will 
likely continue to spread further seaward from the State to the Federal maritime areas 
(Houseknecht & Bird, 2006); this should be an indication to the State of Alaska that 
smarter coordination of Federal oil and gas regulation in the Arctic Alaska OCS is in its 
best interest and any tools that could help with this coordination and planning process 
should be utilized.  
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5. POTENTIAL INTEGRATION OF FEDERAL AND STATE STRATEGIES 
THROUGH MARINE SPATIAL PLANNING 
 
Oil and gas companies formulate their plans for exploration and drilling based on 
various metrics such as global oil prices, political risk in regions, and technical 
challenges, and the Federal and State regulation and levels of planning also play an 
important role in the timing of projects and often dictate where projects can occur 
(Ermida, 2014). As seen previously, the current permitting processes address issues on a 
project-by-project, media-by-media basis. This piecemeal approach could very well result 
in an overload of applications needing agency review that do not receive adequate 
attention to detail or make the entire process utterly inefficient due to unforeseen conflicts 
arising (Clement et al., 2013). The Arctic is a place requiring cooperation and 
coordination from all stakeholders due to its remoteness, harsh environment, lack of 
infrastructure, and social issues; while these qualities present great challenges to 
overcome, they also present the opportunity to unite stakeholders in new ways by forming 
partnerships to tackle these common challenges. The limitations in the current permitting 
system call for supplemental methods to address gaps occurring during the regulatory 
process. Marine Spatial Planning (MSP) could be one tool used to supplement regulations, 
identifying issues among stakeholders and providing a platform for discussions and 
negotiations to occur before projects reach the permitting stage. 
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U.S. National Ocean Policy and Marine Spatial Planning 
 
 The U.S. Federal Government has adopted a policy to support coastal and marine 
spatial planning (to which it refers as CMSP—MSP will be used in this research to mean 
any spatial planning in the coastal and marine environment); this support was first 
recommended by the National Ocean Commission in 2004 and was further solidified 
when the National Ocean Policy was promulgated in 2010 by Executive Order 13547 
(Olsen, McCann, & Fugate, 2014). The National Ocean Council, established upon 
promulgation of the National Ocean Policy and which consists of 27 Federal agencies, 
departments, and offices, developed an Implementation Plan to outline specific actions 
Federal agencies will take to boost the ocean economy, improve ocean health, support 
local communities, strengthen security, and provide better science and information to 
improve decision-making (National Ocean Policy Implementation Plan, 2013). The 
Implementation Plan claims that it does not create new regulations, supersede current 
regulations, or modify any agency’s established mission, jurisdiction, or authority, and its 
stated goal is to provide tools and services for improved planning of marine activities, 
including MSP at the regional level. States, tribes, and Regional Fishery Management 
Councils may choose to participate on regional planning bodies established under the 
National Ocean Policy; however, this participation is voluntary and if states within a 
region choose not to participate, a regional planning body will not be established 
(National Ocean Policy Implementation Plan, 2013). Briana W. Collier (2013) noted that 
MSP is a fairly new concept in the U.S. and has not been fully embraced, as many 
83 
 
stakeholders who might be affected by it do not agree that the process is useful or 
effective. However, it has been suggested that the fact it is not well established in the U.S. 
provides the opportunity for relevant stakeholders to structure the governance regime for 
MSP so that it suits the needs of a particular region (Collier, 2013). Despite this relatively 
short history of use, there have been successes attributed to its use in the U.S., most 
notably in the New England region where MSP and tools developed in conjunction with it 
to shift shipping lanes have resulted in a significant decrease in whale strikes by vessels, 
as well as an increase in overall maritime safety by reducing the overlap among ships, 
commercial fishing vessels, and whale watch vessels (Collier, 2013). Ocean managers on 
the West Coast took note of this collaboration among users of the marine space in the 
Northeast and the successes they have achieved and shifted shipping lanes leading into 
major West Coast ports to reduce whale strikes (Collier, 2013).  
Alaska has chosen to not take part in the regional planning body structure 
proposed in the Implementation Plan and, thus, no regional planning body has been 
established under the Alaska/Arctic Region identified in the National Ocean Policy. 
Opposition in Alaska to participation in a regional planning body was broad, with State 
legislators, Alaska’s U.S. congressional delegation, directors from Alaska’s Division of 
Wildlife Conservation, the Alaska Oil and Gas Association, and the Alaska Miners 
Association, among those expressing concern that the MSP/regional planning body 
structure would result in a shift of planning issues away from the State toward Federal 
regulators, with minimal local input on plans; evidence for this view stemmed from the 
fact that the plans presented in the National Ocean Policy had been developed at the 
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Federal level without input from the State and local stakeholders (Carducci, 2012). Part of 
this hesitation also stemmed from the wording in Executive Order 13547 establishing the 
National Ocean Policy, stating that while the Policy does not create new regulations, any 
recommendations that are given by a created regional planning body would be 
implemented by Federal agencies—this would seem to indicate an inherent conflict of 
interest and take authority away from the stakeholders within the regional planning body, 
including the State (Jensen, 2010). Prior to the release of the National Ocean Policy 
Implementation Plan, House Joint Resolution No. 16 was introduced in the 28th Alaska 
State Legislature, passing the House and referred to the Senate Rules Committee ("Bill 
History/Action for 28th Legislature," 2013), urging that the National Ocean Council 
exempt the Alaska region or allow voluntary state participation in the MSP process 
proposed in the Implementation Plan ("HJR 16," 2013). Though the National Ocean 
Policy Implementation Plan ultimately made state participation voluntary, House Joint 
Resolution 16 stated that if Alaska was not exempted or state participation was not made 
voluntary, the Alaska Legislature would oppose and decline to recognize, participate in, 
or enforce the “National Ocean Policy Final Implementation Plan and the [MSP] process 
as it applies to the Alaska and Arctic regions” ("HJR 16," 2013). This refusal was based 
on the following concerns: 1) that Executive Order 13547 establishing the National Ocean 
Council “circumvents Federal congressional authority by giving Federal agencies broad 
authority to zone and regulate oceans, coasts, and the Great Lakes,” including water 
owned and managed by the State; 2) that the parameters of the proposed MSP process 
were “undefined and could potentially apply to inland wetlands and waterways,” affecting 
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activities remote from the marine and coastal areas of the state; 3) that “zoning of 
commercial, recreational, and conservation activities in the oceans and waterways of the 
state could significantly affect resource-based activities in the state;” 4) that the need for 
MSP for the Alaska region has not been “empirically demonstrated;” and 5) that the 
membership of the National Ocean Council consists solely of representatives from 
Federal agencies and organizations, failing to “adequately recognize the interests of states, 
local governments, Alaska Natives, and other stakeholders, and, similarly, that the 
regional planning bodies proposed for the MSP process would not include 
“representatives from industry or other affected stakeholder groups” ("HJR 16," 2013). 
These concerns certainly merit hesitation regarding the Implementation Plan and a 
Federally-imposed MSP process, and while Alaska may not participate in this particular 
regional planning body structure (top-down) proposed in the National Ocean Policy 
Implementation Plan, implementation of MSP could begin at the State or local level and 
relevant Federal stakeholders could be invited to participate on the planning of particular 
projects (bottom-up). It is also important to note that the National Ocean Council stops 
short of encouraging the establishment of ocean zones within which certain human 
activities may or may not occur, focusing more on the mapping out of alternative spatial 
management scenarios to be compared against one another (Collier, 2011). Regardless of 
the specifics for implementation of a marine spatial planning body, the issue of how to 
engage stakeholders remains an essential component of any planning in the Beaufort and 
Chukchi Seas.  
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 Integrated coastal management, or ICM, is the umbrella term for the 
“multidisciplinary process that unites levels of government and the community, science 
and management, sectoral and public interests in preparing and implementing a program 
for the protection and the sustainable development of coastal resources and environments” 
and integrated coastal zone management, or ICZM, is more specific in that it includes the 
planning and management of coastal and estuarine waters, the adjoining and complete 
inter-tidal area, and supra-tidal coastal areas (Sorensen, 2002).  The concept of ICM was 
first developed in the U.S., where it is implemented by state CZMPs; Australia and the 
UN Regional Seas Program adopted the strategy soon after the U.S. (Sorensen, 1997). By 
2000, 35 years of experience involving approximately 698 integrated coastal management 
(ICM) efforts at all levels of governance by 145 countries were identified, many of which 
had encountered avoidable mistakes as a result of the lack of information sharing by ICM 
practitioners (Sorensen, 2002). After the expiration of the Alaska CZMP and prior to the 
failed 2012 ballot initiative to reinstate a CZMP, the pros and cons regarding the previous 
CZMP were debated. Among the pros noted was the fact that the previous coastal 
management program organized forums for local residents to meet with various resource 
agencies over proposed projects. For example, one resident of Anchor Point in 
Southcentral Alaska recalled a community round-table forum organized by the previous 
CZMP regarding natural gas development occurring in Cook Inlet in the early 2000s, 
stating that ensuing development went smoothly, likely in part due to the opportunity for 
locals to have the forum, to find out what activities were occurring, and to learn where to 
follow up with questions (Shedlock, 2012). However, similar opportunities for round-
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table forums in the Alaskan Arctic exist, though there is not a formal, established process 
as noted previously by Eicken et al., 2010. As stated previously, MSP is considered a sub-
activity of overall sea use management (Douvere & Ehler, 2009), and can be one tool 
used in the broader context of ICM (CZMA in the U.S.). Since there is not currently a 
formal movement to reinstate an Alaskan CZMP after the poorly designed 2012 ballot 
initiative failed, development of MSP at a localized level (i.e. Arctic Alaska) could serve 
as a means to establish such a formal process of collaboration among stakeholders without 
waiting for an Alaska CZMP to be reinstated by means of a legislative process.  
While there is support for MSP at the Federal level in the U.S. and in other 
countries, particularly Australia, where it has been used near the Great Barrier Reef, and 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and the U.K., where it has been used primarily for 
coordinating offshore wind and protecting sensitive marine areas in the North Sea 
(Collier, 2013), are there examples that provide indications of local support of MSP? In 
2008, Wesley Flannery and Micheál Ó Cinnéide conducted a study to investigate 
stakeholders’ views regarding MSP at the local level in the small sea-oriented town of An 
Daingean on the southwest coast of Ireland, where marine-based tourism and other 
relatively new uses of the marine space take place alongside traditional fishing activities. 
At the time of the study, Ireland had not fully implemented ICZM and it was thought that 
MSP could serve as a management tool to address this lack of marine ecosystem-based 
management in the country while still furthering the case for local stakeholder 
involvement in the planning process (Flannery & Ó Cinnéide, 2008). Through a detailed 
questionnaire, the authors found that there was broad-ranging support for a local process 
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of MSP and the preferred implementation was at the local rather than national level; 
however, an approach that would nest the local plan within larger area plans was 
suggested (Flannery & Ó Cinnéide, 2008). While this example is taken from Ireland, the 
issues raised in this instance draw a parallel to planning issues in the Alaskan Arctic areas 
of the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas: both involve a relatively small population whose lives 
are inextricably linked to the sea and who are sharing the marine space with more and 
new users. Additionally, Alaska does not currently have a CZMP, similar to the fact that 
Ireland did not have ICZM at the time of the study. With this in mind, perhaps a more 
effective way to introduce the option of MSP than a Federally-proposed program would 
be to introduce the concept at the local level, gauging interest among those stakeholders 
who would be immediately and directly affected by offshore activities in the Beaufort and 
Chukchi Seas. 
 
Rhode Island Ocean SAMP 
 
One example in the U.S. where MSP was implemented at the State level with local 
stakeholder input throughout the planning process of a specific project is Rhode Island’s 
Ocean Special Area Management Plan (SAMP), which includes waters under both State 
and Federal jurisdiction. The CZMA allowed states to develop SAMPs to achieve specific 
policy goals in a set geographic area and has historically been used by states as a means to 
improve water quality and protect habitat in watersheds and estuaries where development 
occurs (Burger, 2011).  The Rhode Island Ocean SAMP is innovative in two specific 
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ways: 1) it uses MSP in conjunction with a SAMP to coordinate existing uses and 
management regimes with offshore development; and 2) it stakes a regulatory claim to 
Federal waters by pushing beyond the State three-mile mark (Burger, 2011). The Ocean 
SAMP was developed to address the need to identify sites for anticipated offshore wind 
farms and was designed to reduce the uncertainties of the often contentious environmental 
impact assessment process required by NEPA by examining trends in environmental 
conditions and existing human activities in the study area, incorporating a spatial analysis 
methodology for identifying suitable areas for new activities or structures (Olsen et al., 
2014). In a previous project in the offshore New England area, a private company, Cape 
Wind, filed a proposal to develop a wind farm in Federal waters off of Massachusetts and 
an eleven year, $40 million legal battle ensued before a Federal lease and construction 
permit was awarded in 2010 (Olsen et al., 2014). Citing the Cape Wind enterprise as a 
lesson to be learned from, Rhode Island sought out an alternative method to the 
established decision-making norm for offshore energy development (Olsen et al., 2014). 
The State of Rhode Island had developed SAMPs as part of its Coastal Management 
Program previously, though without the element of comprehensive spatial analysis of 
existing human activities and environmental sensitivities that this Ocean SAMP would 
incorporate through advanced geographic information system (GIS) mapping and field 
research during the MSP process (Olsen et al., 2014). While the need for data collection 
was vital to development of the Ocean SAMP, the consultative process with stakeholders 
at every step of the process was also a critical feature; results of the information gathering 
and analysis process were conveyed to the many stakeholders as they were identified, and 
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governmental authorities were consulted simultaneously to discuss policies and 
procedures before entering the formal approval process (Olsen et al., 2014). An additional 
advantage with this approach is that it appears projects requiring NEPA or other Federal 
review by law could occur simultaneously with the planning process, using much of the 
same information gathered.  
Among the key stakeholders identified in the early stages of the Ocean SAMP 
were commercial fishers. In one study, commercial fishers were interviewed about their 
views on marine spatial planning and their experience in Rhode Island’s SAMP process 
(Nutters & Pinto da Silva, 2012). The SAMP used a combination of voluntary and legally-
required methods to engage the fishers as key stakeholders: citizen review panels, 
stakeholder meetings and events, public comment periods after each chapter of the plan 
and before the final document was produced, public hearings as each chapter of the plan 
was produced and after the final document was produced, and special meetings with 
commercial fishers and industry leaders (Nutters & Pinto da Silva, 2012). While they 
were invited to meetings and appreciated this opportunity to be involved, commercial 
fishers who were interviewed indicated that the public stakeholder process was not 
designed to allow stakeholders significant influence over outcomes, i.e., placement of 
wind turbines in areas where they fished. The authors propose that this disparity of 
expectations versus outcomes from the perspective of the commercial fishers could have 
been lessened if decision-making managers in the Ocean SAMP process had 
communicated their level of willingness to share decision-making authority more clearly 
from the very beginning (Nutters & Pinto da Silva, 2012).  
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This example of MSP from Rhode Island demonstrates that while MSP allows for 
stakeholder engagement throughout all stages of a project planning process, the 
stakeholders may not necessarily influence the outcome, so stakeholder roles in the 
process should be clearly defined at the initial stages of offshore planning and the goal of 
collaboration and consensus among all stakeholders should remain. Perhaps more 
importantly, the Rhode Island Ocean SAMP demonstrates that the initiative of an 
individual coastal state to extend its MSP and management functions into adjoining 
Federal waters could be an example of a more effective way to negotiate and plan where 
new offshore activities may occur than the regional planning bodies proposed by the 
National Ocean Policy (Olsen et al., 2014), which were designed merely as coordinating 
functions and whose funding base is uncertain (Burger, 2011). Rhode Island’s Ocean 
SAMP capitalizes on the consistency clause of the CZMA, potentially suggesting “that 
this expression of the ecosystem approach to planning and decision making need not be so 
all encompassing, complex and time consuming as to be practically untenable” (Olsen et 
al., 2014). The State-implemented Rhode Island Ocean SAMP utilizes MSP in a way that 
both allows for stakeholder involvement and can create a platform to address issues 
specific to projects early in the planning stages that might otherwise arise later on during 
the permitting process. 
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Marine Spatial Planning as a tool to address the wicked problem of Beaufort and 
Chukchi Sea permitting 
 
As demonstrated in section 4, the current permitting of oil and gas projects in the 
Arctic Alaska OCS and State waters of the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas is a lengthy and 
complicated process. The current approach exposes limitations in the regulatory process 
as permits can require companies to take additional mitigation measures to address 
particular issues but these permits could miss important aspects not explicitly addressed in 
the permit conditions. Additionally, the piecemeal, project-by-project approach does not 
provide a means to proactively account for cumulative effects of multiple development 
projects occurring in the shared marine space. The Five Year Plans issued at the Federal 
level by BOEM and at the State level by ADNR consider and weigh the cumulative 
effects of potential offshore oil and gas development in large areas of coastal and marine 
space in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas; however, the purpose of these Plans is to 
schedule lease sales rather than track projects throughout the actual development process. 
EISs can examine the cumulative effects of activities but are merely procedural and do not 
necessarily dictate improvements that could be made. Additionally, the lease sales that 
these Five Year Plans and EISs set in motion are subject to litigation, and those for the 
Arctic offshore are particular vulnerable to lawsuits due to the heated debate on Arctic 
development among environmental groups, industry representatives, and Federal, State, 
and local planners. For example, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled on 
January 22, 2014, that a portion of the EISs prepared prior to OCS Lease Sale No. 193 in 
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the Chukchi Sea in 2008 were improperly prepared and sent the lawsuit back to the 
district court; the impacts this would have on leases awarded to Shell Gulf of Mexico Inc., 
ConocoPhillips Co., and Statoil USA E&P Inc. in the block in question, if any, were 
unclear (Snow, 2014).  
There is a need for an improved planning process across Federal and State 
agencies so that managers that can adapt to new information and changing technology as 
they emerge throughout the stages of oil and gas project planning in the Beaufort and 
Chukchi Seas. If MSP was determined to be an effective method for improving this 
process, it would have to incorporate as many elements of the wicked problems unique to 
the Arctic as possible, as well as consideration of current regulatory requirements, while 
engaging all applicable stakeholders. In order for MSP to achieve acceptance, the process 
would have to be designed and implemented in a way that streamlined existing efforts 
from key planners rather than adding an additional layer of bureaucracy.  
Kämpf & Haley’s (2011) working paper “Risk Management in the Arctic 
Offshore: Wicked Problems Require New Paradigms” links the wicked problem 
framework with the emerging model of Project Management of the Second Order (PM-2) 
in order to offer strategies for approaching the wicked problem of Arctic offshore 
development in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas. As part of the analysis, the authors use 
four main categories for the risk attitudes of Alaskan Arctic offshore stakeholders, though 
actual risk attitudes occur on a continuous scale, taken from the PMI’s 2009 Practice 
Standard for Project Risk Management: risk-averse, risk-tolerant, risk-neutral, and risk-
seeking. The authors applied these four risk attitude categories to various groups who 
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attended a 22-presentation risk seminar series held during 2010-2011 by the University of 
Alaska North by 2020 Forum and the International Arctic Research Center (Kämpf & 
Haley, 2011). Risk-averse stakeholders are said to be those “not comfortable with risks 
and are willing to avoid the risks”—examples include the North Slope Borough as local 
government, the U.S. Coast Guard as incident commander, and environmental NGOs; 
risk-tolerant stakeholders are said to be “indifferent about risks”—this group includes 
State agencies, the Arctic Council, and academic entities; risk-neutral stakeholders are 
described to “manage risks based on their expected value”—examples include the 
engineering-industry perspective; and risk-seeking stakeholders were those who “see risks 
as challenges and feel excited [about] dealing with them”—no stakeholders present were 
grouped in this category (Kämpf & Haley, 2011). Not all stakeholders fit squarely in each 
category, as some groups have more to gain from Arctic offshore development than 
others; for example, State agencies charged with protecting public and environmental 
health may balance their primary objectives with other objectives, such as increasing State 
revenue and employment or avoiding the costs of moving villages away from coastal 
areas due to lack of economic opportunities (Kämpf & Haley, 2011). While discussing 
strategies for navigating wicked problems, the authors point out that the risk identification 
phase is the most critical and that risk managers, identifying the problem at hand as 
wicked rather than tame, must recognize the shortcomings of traditional risk management 
techniques and conclude that better solutions to wicked problems “are reached through 
extended, face-to-face, facilitated dialog involving diverse stakeholders” (Kämpf & 
Haley, 2011). However, it is important to keep in mind that adding more stakeholders to 
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any problem solving effort “increases ‘transaction costs’”—adding more meetings with 
more stakeholders increases the number of people with whom to communicate, meaning 
the process can become more time-consuming and that agreement among stakeholders 
and planners may become more difficult to achieve (Roberts, 2000). Thus, finding a 
formal process of stakeholder engagement through MSP or another platform would take 
time and practice to improve and “there are no guarantees that the outcome of 
collaboration will be satisfactory to everyone” (Roberts, 2000), though consensus through 
collaboration should remain the goal. As mentioned previously, NGOs can play an 
important role in achieving this goal, since they act as independent units of society and 
can play a role in facilitating education of, communication with, and coordination among 
government agencies, stakeholders, and the public (Calado et al., 2012). 
A combination of technology, social pressures, and regulations can help drive 
marine protection for offshore oil and gas activities (Sharma, 2000 and 2001; Managi et 
al., 2005). The wicked problems unique to offshore oil and gas development in the 
Beaufort and Chukchi Sea include, among others, engineering challenges, environmental 
factors, safety concerns, high costs, logistical challenges, as well as a variety of 
stakeholders with differing views and values, as highlighted in section 1. Additionally, the 
complex environmental permitting process detailed in section 4 is an additional facet of 
the wicked problem, closely tied with the others. MSP, as one possible tool for facilitating 
collaboration among stakeholders and allowing these stakeholders to discuss and assess 
the wicked risks associated with oil and gas development in the Alaskan Arctic offshore, 
would have to incorporate a consideration of all elements of the wicked problem by 
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creating a common platform for stakeholder dialogue and discussion that ends in specific 
planning measures. A start to the design of this type of MSP could incorporate the key 
decision issues for public decision-making in Arctic offshore oil and gas projects 
identified by Flanders, et al. (1998): complexity reduction, consideration of alternatives, 
personal clarification for the decision maker, finding compromises, favoring of interests, 
communication, ability to reuse the method, ease of use, and incorporation of uncertainty. 
These nine issues expand upon Rittel and Webber’s (1973) explanation of public planning 
problems as inherently wicked problems, as opposed to the classes of problems in the 
natural sciences, because wicked problems are ill-defined and “rely upon elusive political 
judgment for resolution.” Stakeholders involved in a comprehensive MSP process for the 
Alaskan Arctic coastal and marine areas would likely include representatives from 
Federal agencies such as BOEM, BSEE, EPA, USFWS, NOAA, USACE, USGS; State 
agencies such as ADNR DO&G, ADEC Div. of Water & Div. of Air Quality, ADF&G; 
regional bodies such as the North Slope Borough, native villages and communities 
(Barrow, Kaktovik, Nuiqsut, Atquasuk, Wainwright, Point Lay, Point Hope), Arctic Slope 
Regional Corporation, Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission, Eskimo Walrus 
Commission; representatives from the oil and gas, shipping, and commercial fishing 
industries; DoD entities such as the Navy and Coast Guard; the cruise ship industry and 
other recreational users; research scientists; port authorities; and NGOs. While this list is 
not conclusive, it represents the broad span of stakeholders in the Alaskan Arctic.  
What could impede implementation of MSP at the State level in Alaska? As 
shown previously, many of the issues faced in Beaufort and Chukchi offshore oil and gas 
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development are unique to the region and adoption of an approach for offshore MSP used 
elsewhere, such as in Rhode Island, would require intensive modification before it could 
be implemented effectively. Representatives from State agencies and interest groups have 
already indicated concern that the MSP/regional planning body structure set forth by the 
Federal government as part of the National Ocean Policy would take planning decisions 
away from the State and other local stakeholders. However, as demonstrated by Rhode 
Island’s Ocean SAMP, a state can initiate the MSP process and gain Federal approval 
later. While Rhode Island did so under a program of its CZMP that resulted in a manner 
consistent with the Federal strategy outlined in the National Ocean Policy, Alaska does 
not currently have a CZMP in place. Alaska could reinstitute its CZMP if it wished to go 
through the Federal approval process or could implement MSP with an already existing 
agency, such as the ADNR, which currently has authority to plan offshore oil and gas 
projects in State waters, and invite Federal stakeholders to participate. If MSP were 
determined to not be suitable for use in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas upon further 
analysis, the process used in Rhode Island to engage stakeholders in the planning process 
could be used as an example upon which to be improved. 
One potential solution to account for the skepticism in Alaska regarding MSP 
would be to start with a small-scale pilot project, perhaps through a volunteer partnership 
among an NGO, marine-use stakeholders such as fishers and aboriginals, several State or 
local regulatory agencies, and an oil and gas company operating in the Beaufort or 
Chukchi Sea in State waters. Such an MSP pilot project would allow for testing the 
applicability of MSP to address the wicked problems of offshore oil and gas development 
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in the region, including the complex environmental permitting process. A pilot project 
would also allow for MSP to be tested in the region without the high costs associated with 
implementing a new program at the State-level and could allow for time to tailor MSP to 
address the elements of the wicked problem unique to the Arctic offshore. It has also been 
noted that while most instances of MSP use zoning, not all areas where MSP is in place 
employ ocean zoning (Collier, 2013). 
Additionally, existing publicly-available data could be incorporated into an MSP 
process for Beaufort and Chukchi Sea oil and gas planning in order to avoid duplication 
of efforts. For example, BOEM has created maps of its Beaufort and Chukchi Sea 
planning areas for use in Five Year Plans that show areas of subsistence use (see 
Appendix B); the Alaska Ocean Observing System (AOOS), a network of critical ocean 
and coastal observations, has oceanographic data and information on Alaska’s marine 
ecosystems; and the National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC) contains a wealth of 
GIS data regarding sea ice distribution. 
In an effort to coordinate applied science on Alaska’s North Slope, Federal, State 
and local governments formed the North Slope Science Initiative (NSSI) in 2001 and this 
intergovernmental organization was formally authorized by Section 348 of the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 (Streever et al., 2011). The NSSI seeks “to facilitate and improve 
collection and dissemination of ecosystem information pertaining to the Alaskan North 
Slope region, including coastal and offshore regions ("Scope, Mission and Vision of the 
NSSI," 2012). The NSSI contains a North Slope Science Catalog for project tracking and 
data sharing and is just one of the many tools that Federal and State regulatory agencies 
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can utilize to examine the best available scientific research before issuing specific permits 
for offshore oil and gas activities in the Arctic; however, the need to coordinate the 
issuance of permits across a broader temporal and spatial scale between those same 
Federal and State agencies still exists as Arctic development increases. MSP could be one 
tool to assist stakeholders through the permitting process and is worthy of further 
consideration.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
 The planning and permitting of offshore oil and gas in the Beaufort and Chukchi 
Seas presents many wicked challenges from a political, social, cultural, environmental, 
economic, and technical standpoint. It has been demonstrated by various government 
reports and by statements from government representatives that an improved planning and 
permitting process for this region is needed in order to accommodate the predicted 
increase in the use of the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas. Marine Spatial Planning (MSP) at 
the local or State level may help to serve as one mechanism to formally engage 
stakeholders, with the flexibility to adapt to the ever-changing nature of wicked problems 
as new information and risks surface, potentially allowing for a smoother, more effective 
environmental permitting process for projects. While MSP implemented at the local or 
State level may not be the only answer for tackling the wicked problem of offshore oil and 
gas planning in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, the planning considerations that 
implementation of MSP require are worthy of further review, particularly those 
considerations regarding stakeholder engagement. 
MSP is a relatively new concept in the U.S. and it remains to be seen if it will 
become firmly established as a decision-making tool. Stakeholders interested in Beaufort 
and Chukchi oil and gas planning should closely watch how states that have implemented 
MSP, such as Rhode Island, fare in the coming years, particularly regarding how well the 
process engages stakeholders and reduces conflict. 
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APPENDIX A 
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION ON FEDERAL PERMITS 
 
 
Figure 17. BOEM permitting process for G&G activities. (Source: BOEM) 
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APPENDIX B 
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION ON FEDERAL OCS LEASING 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Historic lease sales in the Alaska OCS by BOEM. (Source: BOEM) 
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Figure 19. Mapping of subsistence areas in the Federal waters of the Chukchi Sea. The subsistence 
mapping is for use in BOEM's Five Year Plan for the Alaska OCS. (Source: BOEM) 
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Map C: Shows Chukchi Sea Analytical Considerations 
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Figure 20. Mapping of subsistence areas in the Federal waters of the Beaufort Sea. The subsistence 
mapping is for use in BOEM's Five Year Plan for the Alaska OCS. (Source: BOEM) 
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Map D: Shows Beaufort Sea Analytical Considerations  
